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FUNDAMENTALLY DIFFERENT FACTOR VARIANCES UNDER THE CLEAN
WATER ACT: SHOULD THEY BE APPLICABLE TO TOXIC
POLLUTANTS?
I. INTRODUCTION
The Clean Water Act (Act)I imposes strict and at times prohibitively
expensive controls on the discharge of pollutants by industrial sources in or-
der to protect and upgrade the quality of our nation's waterways. 2 The goal
of the Act is the elimination of the "disease" of water pollution, which harms
the environment and which, "like any other disease, . . . can kill us."'3
Because of the harmful effects of pollution and the tremendous cost of
pollution control, the accurate prediction of the pollution control standards
applicable to individual dischargers is essential from the standpoint of indus-
trial planning and environmental protection.4 While dischargers of pollu-
1. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1982).
2. See 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (1982) (setting forth the goals of the Clean Water
Act). For a discussion of the substantive requirements of the Act, see notes 28-55 and
accompanying text ifia. For a discussion of the policy sections of the Act, see note 28
anId accompanying text ihfra. Congress foresaw that the standards imposed by the
Act would not be within the economic capability of some industries. See SENATE
COMM. ON PUB. WORKS, 93D CONG., 1ST SESS., A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE
WATER POLLUTION CONTROL AcT AMENDMENTS OF 1972 1282 (Comm. Print
1973) [hereinafter cited as LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 1972] (statement of Sen. Bentsen).
As Senator Bentsen stated, "There is no doubt that we will suffer some disruptions in
our economy because of our efforts [to clean the nation's waterways]; many marginal
plants may be forced to close." Id. In addition, the EPA, Commerce Department
and Council on Environmental Quality estimated that there would be 200 to 300
plant closings caused by the imposition of the lowest level of pollution control in the
Act. EPA v. National Crushed Stone Ass'n., 449 U.S. 64, 80 (1980). For a discussion
of National Crushed Stone, see notes 82-83 & 85-89 and accompanying text in/ra.
3. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 1972, supra note 2, at 161 (statement of Sen. Muskie,
Chairman of the Subcommittee on Air and Water Pollution).
4. See 33 U.S.C. § 1251 (1982) (noting the goals of environmental protection and
research to develop pollution control technology). Without some degree of certainty
as to the standards applicable to an individual discharger, the discharger cannot pre-
pare for the cost of compliance and scientists cannot even attempt to predict the level
of pollution which will be achieved and its effect on the environment. See Cairns,
Regulattng Hazardous Chemicals in Aquatic Environments, 11 B. C. ENV. AFF. L. REv. 1, 2,
5 (1983) (discussing the problems in prediction of the effect of toxic chemicals).
The Clean Water Act authorizes the Administrator of the Environmental Pro-
tection Agency (Administrator of EPA or Administrator) to impose national technol-
ogy based effluent standards on classes and categories of pollutants. See E. I. du Pont
de Nemours & Co. v. Train, 430 U.S. 112 (1977) (the Administrator can promulgate
single number limits). For a more thorough discussion of technology based effluent
limitations, see notes 33-49 and accompanying text inia. The Act's regulatory
scheme authorizes the Administrator to impose technology-based effluent limitations
on "conventional" pollutants of increasing exactitude. See 33 U.S.C. § 1311 (b) (1) (A),
(b)(2)(A) (1982) (best practicable control technology (BPT) based effluent limita-
tions). For a discussion of the regulation of conventional pollutants, see notes 28-46
(771)
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tants are generally regulated according to the class or category to which they
belong, 5 in limited circumstances the Act expressly provides for individual-
ized levels of control which are invariably more lenient and less expensive
than those regulating the category. 6 Alternatively, a discharging source may
apply for a Fundamentally Different Factor (FDF) variance, an administra-
tively-created device which accommodates noncompliance with categorical
discharge limitations by substituting an individualized level of control.
7
FDF variances may dramatically affect the enforcement of standardized
levels of pollution control because they are potentially applicable to all efflu-
ent limitations under the Act. 8 Recently, the Third Circuit, in NationalAsso-
and accompanying text thfra. The Administrator is also authorized to impose special
effluent limitations and prohibitions on toxic pollutants. See 33 U.S.C. § 1317(a)(2)
(1982) (best available control technology (BAT) based effluent limitations). For a
discussion of the regulations of toxic pollutants, see notes 47-49 and accompanying
text ihfra. The Administrator may issue regulations for the pretreatment of effluents
destined for publicly owned treatment works (POTWs). See 33 U.S.C. § 1317(b)(1)
(1982) (regulation of pollutants which will interfere with or pass through POTWs).
For a discussion of pretreatment regulation see notes 43-44 and accompanying text
znfra. Finally, the Administrator may impose effluent limitations for new sources in
designated categories of polluters. See 33 U.S.C. § 1316 (1982) (best available demon-
strated control technology (BADCT) based effluent limitations). For a discussion of
the regulation of new sources, see notes 45-46 and accompanying text zhfra.
5. See 33 U.S.C. § 131 l(b)(2)(A) (1982) (regulation of "category or class" of dis-
chargers). For an example of class or category of polluters, see 40 C.F.R. § 408.420
(1983) (canned and preserved seafood processing point source category, mechanized
clam processing subcategory). For a discussion of classes and categories of discharg-
ers, as well as examples of the way classes and categories are established, see note 50
and accompanying text infra.
6. See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. § 1311(c) (1982) (economic variances); Id § 1311(g) (envi-
ronmental variances). A source may be entitled to an economic variance when it can
show it is using the maximum technology it is economically capable of, and that this
will result in progress toward the elimination of pollutants. See 33 U.S.C. § 1311 (c)
(1982). For a discussion of economic variances from categorical standards, see notes
63-67 and accompanying text zhfra. A source may be entitled to a § 301 (g) environ-
mental variance if it meets requirements relating to water quality standards and
goals. See 33 U.S.C. § 1311(g) (1982). Both § 301(c) and § 301(g) variances relate
only to BAT standards. For a discussion of BAT, see note 37 and accompanying text
nfra. For a discussion of environmental variances from categorical standards, see
notes 68-71 and accompanying text zhfra.
7. See 40 C.F.R. § 125.30 (1983) (outlining the purpose and scope of FDF vari-
ances). Fundamentally different factor variance provisions are not contained in the
Act itself but were promulgated by the Environmental Protection Agency pursuant
to delegated authority. See 33 U.S.C. § 1361 (1982) (authorizing Administrator "to
prescribe such regulations as are necessary to carry out his functions"). For a discus-
sion of FDF variances, see notes 76-116 and accompanying text infra.
8. 40 C.F.R. § 125.30(a) (1983). At the present time FDF variance regulations
provide that they apply to "all national [pollutant discharge] limitations promul-
gated under Sections 301 and 304 of the Act," with one minor exception. 40 C.F.R.
§ 125.30(a) (1983). See R. ZENER, GUIDE TO FEDERAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 67
(1981) (FDF variances under present regulations apply to technology-based limita-
tions on direct dischargers as well as pretreatment standards). For a discussion of
technology-based limitations and pretreatment standards imposed by the Act, see
notes 28-46 and accompanying text ihfra. For a discussion of a recent Third Circuit
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ciarion of Metal Finishers v. EPA,9 and the Fourth Circuit, in Appalacian Power
Co. v. Tratn,'° have disagreed as to whether allowing FDF variances for toxic
pollutants is inconsistent with the Clean Water Act's stringent regulation of
toxics.II The Supreme Court has agreed to address this issue1 2 at the same
time that Congress is considering a proposed amendment to the Act which
would expressly authorize FDF variances for toxic pollutants. 13 It is hoped
that understanding the foundation and operation of FDF variances will en-
courage informed decision making regarding the desirability of FDF vari-
ances for toxic pollutants. On a broader scope, understanding the FDF
variance provision should foster a better understanding of the specific tech-
nology-based limitations employed to control water pollution.'
4
This note will provide a preliminary overview of The Clean Water Act
in an attempt to explain the FDF variance in relation to the Act's overall
structure, including the variances expressly authorized by Congress.1 5
Against that background, the competing considerations concerning FDF
opinion disallowing FDF variances from pretreatment standards, see notes 102-10
and accompanying text zhfra.
The Supreme Court has stated that variances are not applicable to effluent limi-
tations for new sources. See E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Train, 430 U.S. 112,
138 (1977) (Congress intended the new source standards "to be absolute prohibi-
tions"). For a discussion of these standards, see notes 45-46 and accompanying text
in/ra. For further discussion of the Supreme Court's decision in Du Pont, see notes 80-
81 and accompanying text zn/ra.
9. 719 F.2d 624 (3d Cir. 1983), cert. granted sub nom. Chemical Mfrs. Ass'n. v.
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 104 S. Ct. 2167 (1984).
10. Appalachian Power Co. v. Train, 620 F.2d 1040 (4th Cir. 1980) (Appalachian
11. See Metal Fihishers, 719 F.2d at 645-46 (§ 301(/) of the Act should be inter-
preted as prohibiting FDF variances for toxic pollutants). But see Appalachian II, 620
F.2d at 1047-48 (§ 301(1) prohibition against variances for toxic pollutants did not
prohibit an FDF variance). For a discussion of Metal Ftnihers and Appalachian II, see
notes 93-108 and accompanying text zt/a.
12. National Ass'n. of Metal Finishers v. EPA, 719 F.2d 624 (3d Cir. 1983), cert.
grantedsub nom. Chemical Mfrs. Ass'n. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 104
S. Ct. 2167 (1984) (raising the issue whether § 301 (1) of the Act precludes fundamen-
tally different factor variances for toxic pollutants).
13. See [Current Developments] ENV'T REP. (BNA) 1307, 1307 (Nov. 18, 1983).
This amendment was proposed by EPA Administrator Ruckelshaus on November
15, 1983. Id. For the text of the proposed amendment which would allow FDF
variances for toxic pollutants, see note Ill in/ra. For a discussion of Administrator
Ruckelshaus' arguments in favor of this amendment, see notes 112-13 in/ra.
14. An understanding of FDF variances will further an understanding of the
specific technology-based limitations because FDF variances are, in effect, individual-
ized technology-based limitations for specific plants. See EPA v. National Crushed
Stone Ass'n., 479 US. 64, 79 n. 18 (1980) (deferring to EPA's interpretation of FDF
variances as an individualized definition of a technology-based limitation). For a
general discussion of FDF variances, see notes 76-89 and accompanying text in/ra.
15. For a discussion of the basic structures of the Act, see notes 28-75 and ac-
companying text infa. For a discussion of economic variances from categorical stan-
dards, see notes 63-67 and accompanying text infra. For a discussion of
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variances in the context of toxic pollutants will be explored, 16 leading to the
suggestion that no variances be allowed for toxic pollutant discharges.
II. FEDERAL WATER POLLUTION CONTROL
A. Background and Scheme of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act
Prior to 1972, the Federal Water Pollution Control Act (FWPCA) 17 was
founded upon a set of water quality standards, which defined maximum ac-
ceptable levels of pollution in navigable waters.' 8 In enforcement actions
the government was required to show that a given area's unacceptable water
quality was caused by a specific individual discharge of pollutants.' 9 Be-
cause it required the government to cross this "virtually unbridgeable causal




In 1972 Congress amended the FWPCA in an effort to avoid previously
experienced enforcement obstacles and to quiet rising public concern about
16. For a discussion of the competing arguments for and against FDF variances
for toxics, see notes 117-42 and accompanying text infra.
17. Federal Water Pollution Control Act, Pub. L. No. 92-500, § 2, 86 Stat. 816-
96 (1976), (codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1982)). The "Federal
Water Pollution Control Act" was the title of the federal legislation on water pollu-
tion prevention and control before 1977. See id Official Comment § 1. The 1977
Amendments changed the Act's name to the "Clean Water Act." See 33 U.S.C.
§ 1251 Official Comments (1982).
18. See Water Quality Act of 1965, Pub.. L. 89-234, § 5(a), 79 Stat. 903, 907, 910
(1965) (procedure for establishing water quality standards in the FWPCA prior to
1972) (current version at 33 U.S.C. §§ 1313-1313(a) (1982) (using approximately the
same system to set standards)). According to Rodgers, "[a] water quality standard is
a legal expression of the amount of pollutants allowed in a defined watercourse,"
such as those contained in § 303 of the present Act, which are set to meet the Act's
goal of "fishable," "swimmable" waters. W. RODGERS, HANDBOOK ON ENVIRON-
MENTAL LAW 356 (1977). See 33 U.S.C. § 1313 (1982) (setting forth the Act's water
quality standards). For the text of the section defining the Act's goals, see note 28
infa. Effluent standards, on the other hand, describe "the amount of pollutants that
can be released legally by a specific source," such as the technology-based effluent
limitations contained in § 301. W. RODGERS, supra, at 356. See 33 U.S.C. § 1311
(1982) (setting forth the Act's technology-based effluent limitations).
19. See Water Quality Actof 1965, Pub. L. 89-234 § 5(a), 79 Stat. 903, 907, 910
(1965) (penalty may be imposed against the dischargers responsible for reducing the
water quality below the standards) (current version at 33 U.S.C. § 1312 (1982)). See
also Note, Effective National Regulation of Poiht Sources Under the 1972 Federal Water Pollu-
tion Control Act." The Double Burden of Legislative Draftsmanship andjudicial Review, 10 GA.
L. REV. 983, 986 (1976) (discussing the difficult causal requirements in the Act prior
to 1972).
20. CPC Int'l, Inc. v. Train, 515 F.2d 1032, 1035 (8th Cir. 1975) (describing the
difficult "unwieldy" enforcement under the FWPCA prior to 1972), cert. denied, 430
U.S. 966 (1977).
21. See id The burden of proof in enforcement actions was so formidable that
prior to 1971 "only one case had reached the courts in more than two decades." Id
(citing LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 1972, supra note 2, at 1423 (describing an "almost total
lack of enforcement" under the Act prior to 1972). See also Note, supra note 19, at
984-86 (discussing other problems with the original FWPCA).
4
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environmental protection. 22 The 1972 amendments adopted a new ap-
proach using technology-based effluent limitations to be enforced through a
mandatory permit program. 23  These amendments established the basic
framework of the present FWPCA, or the "Clean Water Act,' 24 which pro-
vides that "the discharge of any pollutant by any person shall be unlaw-
ful"'25 except in compliance with the Act's effluent limitations26 and permit
requirements.
2 7
B. Technology Based Effluent Limitations
The 1972 amendments to the FWPCA contemplated the phased reduc-
tion of pollution discharge through the permit system and established "the
national goal that the discharge of pollutants into the navigable waters be
eliminated by 1985."28 Under the Act, the EPA Administrator is required to
22. Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. 92-500,§ 2, 86 Stat. 816-96 (1972) (codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1982)).
See American Petroleum Inst. v. EPA, 540 F.2d 1023, 1027 (10th Cir. 1976), cert.
denied, 430 U.S. 922 (1977). The "[plopular demand for legislative action to control
water pollution" was reflected in the fact that only 12 senators and 23 representatives
concurred in President Nixon's veto of the 1972 amendments to the FWPCA. Id
For a brief and descriptive comparison of the quality of water bodies in the United
States in their pristine, historical state versus the polluted conditions of the mid-
1960s, see Comment,Judicial Maelstrom in Federal Waters.: A Composite Interpretation of the
Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, 45 FORDHAM L. REV. 625, 625
(1976).
23. See 33 U.S.C. § 1311 (1982) (setting out various technology-based standards
to be applied to particular dischargers or pollutants).
In addition to technology-based effluent limitations, water quality based effluent
limitations may still be imposed upon a particular point source. See 33 U.S.C. § 1312
(1982). These water quality based effluent limitations may be imposed by state law,
federal laws other than the Clean Water Act, or through § 302 of the Clean Water
Act. See, e.g., PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, §§ 691.1-760.2 (Purdon 1977 & Supp. 1983)
(state limitations); 42 U.S.C. §§ 300(o to 3000)-10 (1982) (Safe Drinking Water Act).
States are authorized under § 510 to impose their own limitations on a source pro-
vided they are more stringent than the federal limits. 33 U.S.C. § 1370 (1982). Sec-
tion 303 directs them to adopt water quality standards, i.e. use designations and
procedures for maintaining them. See 33 U.S.C. § 1313 (1982). The EPA may itself
impose water quality based effluent limitations pursuant to section 302 subject to a
cost/benefit analysis. See 33 U.S.C. § 1312 (1982).
24. The Federal Water Pollution Control Act officially received its short title,
the "Clean Water Act," in the 1977 amendments. 33 U.S.C. § 1251 comments
(1982).
25. 33 U.S.C. § 1311 (1982).
26. For a discussion of the different types of effluent limitations set under the
Act, see notes 28-51 and accompanying text infra.
27. For a discussion of the sections of the Act dealing with permit requirements,
see note 32 and accompanying text infra.
28. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(1) (1982). This goal "has been severely criticized as
potentially involving the nation in expenditures which are vastly excessive and un-
warranted." F. GRAD, TREATISE ON ENVIRONMENTAL LAW § 3.03[21[a], at 3-102
(1983). On the other hand, Senator Edmund Muskie, the primary proponent of the
legislation, described the declaration of goals and policy as "not merely the pious
declarations that Congress so often makes in passing its laws; on the contrary, this is
literally a life or death proposition for the Nation." LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 1972,
5
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promulgate effluent limitations29 of increasing stringency in anticipation of
technological advances30 for different categories of point sources. 31 These
supra note 2, at 164. The full text of § 101(a) states the Act's policies and goals as
follows:
(a) The objective of this chapter is to restore and maintain the chemi-
cal, physical and biological integrity of the Nation's waters. In order to
achieve this objective it is hereby declared that, consistent with the provi-
sions of this chapter-
(1) it is the national goal that the discharge of pollutants into the
navigable waters be eliminated by 1985;
(2) it is the national goal that wherever attainable, an interim
goal of water quality which provides for the protection and propaga-
tion of fish, shellfish, and wildlife and provides for recreation in and on
the water be achieved by July 1, 1983;
(3) it is the national policy that the discharge of toxic pollutants
in toxic amounts be prohibited;
(4) it is the national policy that Federal financial assistance be
provided to construct publicly owned waste treatment works;
(5) it is the national policy that areawide waste treatment man-
agement planning processes be developed and implemented to assure
adequate control of sources of pollutants in each State; and
(6) it is the national policy that a major research and demonstra-
tion effort be made to develop technology necessary to eliminate the
discharge of pollutants into the navigable waters, waters of the contig-
uous zone, and the oceans.
33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (1982).
29. 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b)(l)(A), (b)(1)(B), (b)(2)(A), (b)(2)(E) (1982) (effluent
limitations for the technology based standards applicable to various types of dis-
chargers shall be defined pursuant to or in compliance with regulations issued by the
Administrator pursuant to a specific subsection of § 304). The Act actually only
specifically authorizes the Administrator to promulgate the § 304 "guidelines" upon
which the § 301 effluent limitations are to be based. See 33 U.S.C. § 1311 (1982)
(stating in the passive voice that § 301 limitations shall be established). See also
American Petroleum Inst. v. EPA, 540 F.2d 1023, 1030 (10th Cir. 1976) (stating ear-
lier position of some circuits that the permitting authority would set the final limits).
The Supreme Court, in Du Pont, held that the Administrator has the power to set
§ 301 limitations. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Train, 430 U.S. 112, 128-29
(1977). For further discussion of the Administrator's power to promulgate § 301 limi-
tations, see note 35 and accompanying text infra.
Because the Act set strict deadlines and raised complicated, technical questions
regarding the setting of effluent limitations, the Administrator originally promul-
gated the § 304 guidelines at the same time he promulgated the § 301 effluent limita-
tion. Du Pont, 430 U.S. at 122 (the limitations may be promulgated by the
Administrator simultaneously).
30. See 33 U.S.C. § 1314(b)(1)(B), (b)(2)(B), (b)(4)(B), (c), (d), (g) (1982). These
§ 304 guidelines are used by the Administrator in setting the technology-based efflu-
ent limitations, the least stringent of which is Best Practicable Technology (BPT),
and the most stringent of which is Best Available Demonstrated Control Technology
(BADCT). Id § 311(b)(l)(A) (BPT); id § 1316(a)(1) (BADCT). See F. GRAD, supra
note 28, § 3.03[4][e], at 3-152 to -156 (BAT is the most stringent standard for existing
direct dischargers). One commentator has explained that "[tihe purpose of the efflu-
ent limitation guidelines is to identify the degree of effluent reduction attainable
through application of each technology standard and to specify factors to be taken
into account in determining control measures and practices to be applicable to point
sources." La Pierre, Technology-Forcing and Federal Environmental Protectton Statutes, 62
IOWA L. REV. 771, 809-10 (1977) (footnotes omitted). For a discussion of the Admin-
[Vol. 29: p. 771
6
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 29, Iss. 3 [1984], Art. 8
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol29/iss3/8
1983-84] THIRD CIRCUIT REVIEW
limitations are applied to dischargers through the National Pollutant Dis-
charge Elimination System's (NPDES) permit procedure. 32 The schedule of
water pollution control contemplated by the enforcement of effluent limita-
tions can be briefly summarized as follows:
(1) Existtng Direct Dischargers 33
Section 301 of the FWPCA directs the Adminstrator to promulgate ef-
fluent limitations for all existing point sources of water pollution. 34 These
limitations required direct dischargers to implement the "best practicable
control technology currently available" (BPT) by July 1, 1977. 3' Limita-
istrator's power to apply the guidelines and set the effluent limitations, see note 35
infra.
31. See 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b)(2)(A) (1982) (regulation of categories and classes of
sources of conventional pollutants); id § 1316(b)(1)(A) (setting out a list of new
source categories for regulation); id. § 1317(a)(2) (regulation of classes and categories
of sources discharging toxic pollutants). For some examples of subcategorization, see
EPA Effluent Limitations Guidelines, 40 C.F.R. §§ 408.10-.336 (1983) (canned and
preserved seafood processing point source category with 31 subcategories).
32. 33 U.S.C. § 1342 (1982). A source must obtain an NPDES permit to dis-
charge pollutants. Id § 1311 (a) (any discharge of pollutants not in compliance with
a permit's effluent limitations is unlawful). See W. RODGERS, supra note 16, at 452
(the basic premise of the 1972 amendments is that discharge of pollutants is unlawful
unless it is conducted in compliance with the NPDES system). NPDES permits can
be granted either by the EPA or by a state with an approved permit program. See 33
U.S.C. § 1342(a) (1982) (EPA granted permits); id. § 1342(b) (state granted permits).
Even if a state does not have an approved permit program, a discharger must nor-
mally get a certification from the state in which it discharges in order to get a federal
NPDES permit. Id. § 1341. The EPA retains the power to "veto" any state-granted
permit which will not put the source in compliance with the terms of the Act. Id.
§ 1342(d)(2) (if the state does not submit an acceptable permit to the Administrator
within 30 days of notification of a veto, the Administrator may issue a Federal permit
for the source).
33. See 33 U.S.C. § 1311 (1982). The industrial dischargers and publicly owned
treatment works (POTW's) regulated under § 301 are by definition "direct"
dischargers: they discharge their effluent directly into a watercourse, rather than into
a POTW. See Metal Finishers, 719 F.2d at 633 (distinguishing direct from indirect
dischargers).
34. 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b)(1)(A) (1982). Section 301(b) (1) (A) deals with "effluent
limitations for point sources other than publicly owned treatment works." Id New
dischargers are regulated separately under § 306. See id. § 1316. For further discus-
sion of the regulation of new sources, see notes 45-46 and accompanying text infra.
35. 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b)(1)(A) (1982). In promulgating the guidelines to be
used in determining BPT for a particular point source, the Administrator must in-
clude the factors set out in § 304(b)(l)(B):
Factors relating to the assessment of best practicable control technol-
ogy currently available . . . shall include consideration of the total cost of
application of technology in relation to the effluent reduction benefits to be
achieved from such application, and shall also take into account the age of
equipment and facilities involved, the process employed, the engineering
aspects of the application of various types of control techniques, process
changes, non-water quality environmental impact (including energy re-
quirements), and such other factors as the Administrator deems
appropriate. . ..
Id § 1314(b)(1)(B). BPT standards are "based upon the average of the best existing
7
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tions based on BPT, the least demanding standard under the Act, were in-
tended to be imposed for an interim period only.36
The second stage in the implementation of pollution controls under the
Act requires direct dischargers to obtain the "best available technology eco-
nomically achievable" (BAT), as determined by the Administrator, accord-
ing to enumerated considerations. 37 Originally BAT based limitations were
performance by plants of various sizes, ages and unit processes within each industrial
category." LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 1972, supra note 2, at 169. AccordTanners' Council
of America, Inc. v. Train, 540 F.2d 1188, 1191-92 (4th Cir. 1976) (BPT based on
average of the best in the subcategory); American Meat Inst. v. EPA, 526 F.2d 442,
461-62 (7th Cir. 1975) (the average of the best plants is used to determine BPT). If
the technology within an industry is uniformly inadequate, the Administrator can
"require higher levels of control than any currently in place if he determines that the
technology to achieve those higher levels can be practicably applied." LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY 1972, supra note 2, at 169-70.
The Act does not explicitly give the Administrator the power to promulgate
BPT effluent limitations. See Du Pont, 430 U.S. at 128 (§ 301 "speaks only in the
passive voice of the achievement and establishment of the limitations"). However,
the EPA's power to promulgate binding § 301 effluent limitations was settled by the
Du Pont Court's adoption of what had been the majority view of the circuits. See Du
Pont, 430 U.S. at 125 n.15, 128-29 (Administrator of EPA has the power to set 1977
BPT effluent regulation) (citing American Frozen Food Inst. v. Train, 539 F.2d 107,
128 (D.C. Cir. 1976); Hooker Chems. & Plastics Corp. v. Train, 537 F.2d 620, 628 (2d
Cir. 1976); American Meat Inst., 526 F.2d at 452; American Iron & Steel Inst. v. EPA,
526 F.2d 1027, 1042 (3d Cir. 1975), modified, 560 F.2d 589 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied,
435 U.S. 914 (1978)). For a discussion of the position of the circuits prior to the
Supreme Court's decision in Du Pont, see La Pierre, supra note 30, at 814-18.
36. See F. GRAD, supra note 18, § 3.03, at 3-152 to -153 (BPT limitations are the
initial and least demanding limitations).
37. 33 U.S.C. § 1311 (b)(2)(A) (1982). In promulgating the guidelines to be used
in determining BAT for a particular point source, the Administrator must include
the factors set out in § 304(b)(2)(B): "the age of equipment and facilities involved,
the process employed, the engineering aspects of the application of various types of
control techniques, process changes, the cost of achieving such effluent reduction,
non-water quality environmental impact (including energy requirements), and such
other factors as the Administrator deems appropriate." Id. § 1314(b)(2)(B). The fac-
tors which control the BAT determination are the same factors looked at in setting
BPT with two exceptions. Id See Note, EPA v. National Crushed Stone Assoctation, 10
ECOL. L. Q. 161, 163-64 (1982). Best Available Technology standards "should, at a
minimum, be established with reference to the best performer in any industrial cate-
gory." LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 1972, supra note 2, at 170. AccordTanners' Council of
America, Inc. v. Train, 540 F.2d 1188, 1195 (4th Cir. 1976) (BAT limitations look to
the best performer in the industry and to unused technology that will be available by
the compliance deadline); American Meat Inst. v. EPA, 526 F.2d 442, 463 (7th Cir.
1975) (BAT should be established "with reference to the best performer in any indus-
trial category" (quoting LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 1972, supra note 2, at 170 (statement
of Sen. Muskie))). Best Available Technology limitations for a class of dischargers
may consider technology in use by other categories of dischargers and technology
"which can be applied as a result of public and private research efforts." LEGISLA-
TIVE HISTORY 1972, supra note 2, at 170 (statement of Sen. Muskie). The Adminis-
trator's power to promulgate BAT effluent limitations has not been subject to serious
challenge because § 301(b)(2)(A) calls for " 'effluent limitations for categories and
classes of point sources,' " a task seen as best suited for national regulation. Du Pont,
430 U.S. at 126-27 (quoting 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b) (2) (A) (1982)).
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to be imposed by July 1, 1983.38 The 1977 amendments to the Act extended
the deadline one year for most regulated non-toxic pollutants 39 and replaced
the BAT standard for conventional pollutants with a "best conventional pol-
lutant control technology" (BCT) standard.40
(2) Pub&icy Owned Treatment Works
Publicly owned treatment works (POTW's) are required to achieve ef-
fluent limitations based on "secondary treatment" 4 1 as defined by the Ad-
38. See Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. 92-
500, § 2, 86 Stat. 899 (1972) (amended 1977).
39. See 33 U.S.C. § 1314(a)(4) (1982). These "conventional pollutants," labelled
non-toxic pollutants, have traditionally been regulated: biological oxygen demand,
suspended solids, fecal coliform and pH. Id All other non-toxic pollutants are still
regulated under BAT effluent limitations pursuant to § 301(b)(2)(F). See id.
§ 1311 (b) (2) (F).
40. See 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b)(2)(E) (1982). The Federal Water Pollution Control
Act was amended in 1977 to institute "necessary midcourse corrections" in federal
water pollution control. See SENATE COMM. ON ENVT. & PUB. WORKS, 95TH CONG.
2D SESS., A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE CLEAN WATER ACT OF 1977, A CONTIN-
UATION OF THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE FEDERAL WATER POLLUTION CON-
TROL ACT 181 (Comm. Print 1978) [hereinafter cited as LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
19771 (statement of the President). BCT effluent limitations are only applicable to
those pollutants listed in, or those which could be listed pursuant to, § 304(a)(4). 33
U.S.C. § 1311 (b)(2)(E) (1982). For the conventional pollutants listed in the Act, see
note 39 supra.
To determine BCT for a particular category of sources the Administrator must
consider the factors set out in § 304(b)(4)(B):
the reasonableness of the relationship between the costs of attaining a re-
duction in effluents and the effluent reduction benefits derived, and the
comparison of the cost and level of reduction of such pollutants from the
discharge from publicly owned treatment works to the cost and level of
reduction of such pollutants from a class or category of industrial sources,
and shall take into account the age of equipment and facilities involved, the
process employed, the engineering aspects of the application of various
types of control techniques, process changes, non-water quality environ-
mental impact (including energy requirements), and such other factors as
the Administrator deems appropriate.
33 U.S.C. § 1314(b)(4)(B) (1982). Technology-based effluent limitations based on
BCT are apparently a relaxation of the BAT standards, since the BCT factors are a
mere restatement of the BPT factors with the addition of one "cost effectiveness" test.
See F. GRAD, supra note 26 & 3.03[4][e], at 3-160 to -161 (discussing the requirements
of BPT and BCT limitations). See also American Paper Inst. v. EPA, 660 F.2d 954,
956 (4th Cir. 1981) (two cost effectiveness tests are required under BCT). A Congres-
sional conference described BCT as "the equivalent of best practicable technology or
something a little bit better, even as far as best available technology in some circum-
stances." 123 CONG. REc. 38,978 (1977) (remarks of Rep. Johnson). For the list of
the factors used in determining guidelines for BPT, see note 35 supra.
41. 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b)(l)(B) (1982). Waste water treatment by POTWs has
traditionally been described as consisting of three steps: primary, secondary and ad-
vanced or tertiary treatment. See P. VESILIND, ENVIRONMENTAL POLLUTION AND
CONTROL 63-76 (1975). Primary treatment generally involves the screening and set-
tling of solids from the waste influent. Id. at 63-66. Secondary treatment is generally
biological treatment, that is the "use [of] microbial action to reduce the energy level
(BOD) of the waste." Id at 67. Section 304(d)(4) of the Act lists several accepted
1983-84]
9
Ford: Fundamentally Different Factor Variances under the Clean Water Ac
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1984
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
ministrator pursuant to section 304(d).42
(3) Indirect Dischargers
Indirect dischargers, those industrial plants which discharge their efflu-
ents into POTW's for treatment, must comply with the Act's pretreatment
regulations. 43 Section 307 of the Act requires the Administrator to promul-
gate regulations establishing pretreatment standards for any pollutant which
will interfere with, pass through, or be incompacible with the POTW's treat-
ment system.
44
(4) New Sources of Pollutants
Under section 306, newly constructed sources4 5 are required to meet
national effluent limitations based upon the "best available demonstrated
control technology" (BADCT) standards. 46
secondary treatment technologies. See 33 U.S.C. § 1314(d)(4) (1982). Advanced or
tertiary treatment is any of a "wide variety of methods" used to reduce the remaining
pollutants in the waste stream. P. VESILIND, supra, at 73.
42. See 33 U.S.C. § 1314(d) (1982). Under § 304(d), the Administrator "shall
publish . . . information . . . on the degree of effluent reduction attainable through
the application of secondary treatment [and] ...information on alternative waste
treatment management techniques." Id § 1314(d)(1)(2). Another very important
aspect of the regulation of POTWs, which is beyond the scope of this note, is the
construction grant program of subchapter II of the Act. See id §§ 1281-1299. The
purpose of the construction grant program is "to require and to assist the develop-
ment and implementation of waste treatment management plans and practices." Id§ 1281(a).
43. See id. § 1317(b)(1).
44. See id § 1317. Under § 307 the Administrator is directed to publish regula-
tions establishing pretreatment standards for any pollutant which "interferes with,
passes through, or otherwise is incompatible with [POTWs]." Id. § 1317(b)(1). To
date, the Administrator has focused his pretreatment rulemaking on toxic pollutants.
See Metal Fimshers, 719 F.2d at 638, 645 n.25 (remanding regulations for redefinition
of "interference" and "pass through"). For a further discussion of MetalFirhers, see
notes 102-10 and accompanying text tnfia. The Administrator has probably focused
his attention upon pretreatment of toxic pollutants because the nature of toxic pollu-
tants indicates that they inevitably "interfere" with normal biological treatment in a
POTW. See 33 U.S.C. § 1362(13) (1982) (defining a toxic pollutant as something
which will cause death, disease, etc. in organisms); cf note 41 supra (describing secon-
dary treatment of most POTWs as biological treatment by microbial organisms).
45. 33 U.S.C. § 1316(a)(2)(1982). A "new source" for purposes of § 306 is de-
fined in § 306(a)(2) as "any source, the construction of which is commenced after the
publication of proposed regulations prescribing a standard of performance ...
which will be applicable to such source, if such standard is thereafter promulgated in
accordance with this section." Id.
46. Id § 1316(a)(1), (b)(1)(B). Congress intended that BADCT be the "maxi-
mum feasible control of new sources." LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 1972, supra note 2, at
1476. See also 33 U.S.C. § 1316(a)(1) (1982) (standards of performance should "re-
flect[] the greatest degree of effluent reduction .. . achievable through . . .
[BADCT]"). To determine what the BADCT is for a particular category of sources
the Administrator must consider any information generated through § 304(c) under
which the Administrator is to gather and "issue to the States and appropriate water
pollution control agencies . . . information on the processes, procedures or operating
[Vol. 29: p. 771
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Toxic pollutants4 7 are subject to BAT-based effluent limitations for
methods which result in the elimination or reduction of the discharge of pollutants
... . Such information shall include technical and other data, including costs, as
are available on alternative methods of elimination or reduction of the discharge of
pollutants." Id § 1314(c). One commentator has noted that Congress intended that
a BADCT standard "should reflect the level of effluent reduction attainable by the
combination of control technology and improvements in production processes." La
Pierre, supra note 30, at 826. This requirement will be at least as stringent as the BAT
effluent limitations category on an industry. Id
Section 306 standards of performance become effective on promulgation by the
Administrator. 33 U.S.C. § 1316(b)(1)(B) (1982).
47. 33 U.S.C. § 1362(13) (1982). Toxic pollutants are defined in § 502(13) as
those pollutants, or combinations of pollutants, including disease-causing
agents, which after discharge and upon exposure, ingestion, inhalation or
assimilation into any organism, either directly from the environment or in-
directly by ingestion through food chains, will, on the basis of information
available to the Administrator, cause death, disease, behavioral abnormali-
ties, cancer, genetic mutations, physiological malfunctions (including mal-
functions in reproduction) or physical deformations, in such organisms or
their offspring.
Id
Section 307 of the Act was the sole provision regulating toxic pollutants prior to
the 1977 amendments. See Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of
1972, Pub, L. 92-500, § 2, 86 Stat. 844 (1972) (codified as amended at 33 U.S.C.
§ 1311 (1982)). Under § 307 the Administrator is authorized to promulgate health-
based effluent limitations which will insure an "ample margin of safety." 33 U.S.C.
§ 1317(a)(4) (1982). When the EPA did not exercise its § 307 authority, the Natural
Resources Defense Council (NRDC) sued the EPA to force it to promulgate regula-
tions controlling toxic pollutants. See Natural Resources Defense Council v. Train, 8
Env't. Rep. Cas. (BNA) 2120 (D.D.C. 1976). The resulting consent decree is con-
tained in the court's order which is often referred to as the "Flannery settlement," in
reference to the presiding judge. See id. at 2122-36. For an excellent discussion of the
history and impact of this consent decree, see Hall, The Control of Toxic Pollutants Under
the Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, 63 IOWA L. REV. 609, 612-14
(1978).
The "Flannery settlement" forced the Administrator to promulgate technology-
based effluent limitations for toxic pollutants instead of the original health-based lim-
its, and was accepted for the most part by the Congress in the 1977 amendments to
the Act. See 33 U.S.C. § 1311 (b)(2)(C), (D) (1982); See also LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
1977, supra note 40, at 455 ("The conference agreement was specifically designed to
codify the so-called 'Flannery decision'. . . ."). For a discussion of the regulation of
toxics under § 301, see note 48 and accompanying text infra.
The "Flannery settlement" consent decree forced the Administrator to regulate
65 specific toxic pollutants. See Natural Resources Defense Council v. Train, 8 Env't
Rep. Cas. (BNA) 2120, 2124, 2129-30 (D.D.C. 1976). This list of pollutants was in-
corporated by reference into the 1977 amendments to the Act. See 33 U.S.C.
§ 1317(a)(1) (1982). BAT effluent limitations for these "Flannery pollutants" must
have been met by July 1, 1984. Id § 1311(b)(2)(C). The Administrator may add or
subtract pollutants from this toxics list, taking into account certain factors listed in
§ 307(a)(1), such as "toxicity of the pollutant, its persistence, degradability, the usual
or potential presence of the affected organisms in any waters, the importance of the
affected organisms, and the nature and extent of the effect of the toxic pollutant on
such organisms." Id. § 1317(a)(1). Any pollutant added to the toxic list must meet
BAT standards promulgated for that pollutant "not later than three years after the
date such limitations are established." d. § 1311(b)(2)(D).
1983-84]
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classes and categories of sources.48 In addition, section 307 authorizes the
Administrator to set generally applicable health-based effluent standards
based on categories of pollutants, but only if they are more stringent than
the categorical BAT-based limitations.
49
For each of the technology-based effluent standards just discussed-
BPT, BAT, BCT, secondary treatment, pretreatment, and BADCT-the
Administrator promulgates single-number effluent limitations to be applied
to each source within a designated class or category. 50 These single-number
48. See 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b)(2)(C), (D) (1982). The BAT standard for regulation
of toxic pollutants is set by the same procedure as is used in setting BAT for non-
conventional pollutants under section 301 (b) (2) (F). See i. § 1311 (b) (2) (F). For a
description of the procedure used to set BAT guidelines and of the § 304 factors
taken into account by the Administrator in so doing, see note 37 supra. For a general
discussion of the consent decree which originally forced EPA to promulgate technol-
ogy-based effluent standards for toxic pollutants, see note 47 supra. For a discussion
of some perceived benefits of regulation to both the EPA and environmentalists after
the settlement agreement, see Hall, supra note 47, at 620-24.
Mounting Congressional concern over the discharge of toxic pollutants into this
country's waters was evident in the 1972 and 1977 amendments to the FWPCA. See
33 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(3) (1982) (policy of Act is "that the discharge of toxic pollutants
in toxic amounts be prohibited"); see also LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 1977, supra note 40,
at 455 ("discharge of toxic pollutants should be eliminated as soon as possible"); F.
GRAD, supra note 28, § 3.03[4][g], at 3-171 ("As amended in 1977, the [Act] places
considerably greater emphasis on the regulation of toxic pollutants. ... ).
49. See 33 U.S.C. § 1317(a)(2) (1982). After the 1972 amendments and prior to
the "Flannery settlement" in 1976, § 307 health-based standards were the only limi-
tations on toxic pollutants under the Act. See Federal Water Pollution Control
Amendments, Pub. L. 92-500, § 2, 86 Stat. 816, 856 (1972) (codified as amended at
33 U.S.C. § 1317 (a)(2) (1982)). For a discussion of the "Flannery settlement," see
note 47 supra. Section 307(a)(2) now states:
The Administrator, in his discretion, may publish in the Federal Register a
proposed effluent standard (which may include a prohibition) establishing
requirements for a toxic pollutant which, if an effluent limitation is applica-
ble to a class or category of point sources, shall be applicable to such cate-
gory or class only if such standard imposes more stringent requirements.
Such published effluent standard (or prohibition) shall take into account
the toxicity of the pollutant, its persistence, degradability, the usual or po-
tential presence of the affected organisms in any waters, the importance of
the affected organisms and the nature and extent of the effect of the toxic
pollutant on such organisms, and the extent to which effective control is
being or may be achieved under other regulatory authority.
33 U.S.C. § 1317(a)(2) (1982). Regulation of toxic pollutants under § 307 is on a
pollutant-by-pollutant basis, as opposed to an industry-by-industry basis, which is
applied to non-toxic pollutants pursuant to § 301. Hall, supra note 47, at 613, 620-21
(noting that the § 307 health-based limitation was described by EPA as the "pollu-
tant of the month" approach).
50. See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b)(2)(A) (1982) (sources within a defined class or
category shall achieve BAT as determined by the Administrator). The Administra-
tor's power to promulgate single number effluent limitations for classes and catego-
ries of sources was settled in E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Train, 430 U.S. 112
(1977). Prior to Du Pont there was a disagreement among the circuits as to whether
the Administrator could promulgate binding effluent limitations. Id. at 125 n.15.
For a discussion of the disagreement between the circuits on the Administrator's
power to issue effluent limitations, see note 35 supra. There was also a disagreement
among the circuits as to whether effluent limitations promulgated by the Administra-
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effluent limitations are included as conditions on each source's NPDES
permit.51
The Administrator's determinations with respect to effluent limitations
and NPDES permit applications are reviewable in the court of appeals.
52
The provisions of the FWPCA may be enforced by the federal government,
tor could be single-number limitations, such as one pound per day per source, or
whether the limitations had to provide for a range of discharges, such as one to five
pounds per day per source, with the specific single-number limits being set by the
permitting authority. See Du Pont, 430 U.S. at 125 n. 15. Compare Grain Processing
Corp. v. Train, 407 F. Supp. 96, 105 (S.D. Iowa) (Congress intended a range of efflu-
ent limitations, therefore single-number effluent limitations inappropriate), remanded
mem., 547 F.2d 1172 (8th Cir. 1976) with E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Train,
541 F.2d 1018, 1028-30 (4th Cir. 1976) (single-number effluent limitations may be
established for classes and categories of sources), af'd in part, rev'd in part, 430 U.S. 112,
128 (1977) (single-number BPT-based technology limits may be established "so long
as some allowance is made for variations in individual plants"). For a discussion of
the Supreme Court's tacit approval of FDF variances in Du Pont, see notes 80-81 and
accompanying text infa.
The effluent limitations applicable to a particular point source are those of the
class or category in which the particular industry is intended, as determined by the
Administrator in the promulgation of the effluent limitations. See 33 U.S.C.
§ 131 l(b)(2)(A) (1982). See, e.g., National Crushed Stone Ass'n v. EPA, 601 F.2d 111,
112 (4th Cir. 1979) (example of subcategorization in the "crushed stone and con-
struction sand and gravel subcategories of the mineral mining and processing point
source category"), rev'd, 449 U.S. 64 (1980); American Meat Inst. v. EPA, 526 F.2d
442, 446, 457-62 (7th Cir. 1975) (example of subcategorization of the "'Red Meat
Processing Segment of the Meat Products Point Source Category,'" and challenges
to effluent limitations for each subcategory). For an example of extensive categoriza-
tion, subcategorization and subdivision of subcategories, see Weyerhaeuser Co. v.
Costle, 590 F.2d 1011, 1053 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (within the pulp and paper industry
there were "16 subcategories, divided into 66 subdivisions," on the average of "one
set of limitations to every five mills"). A subcategory's effluent limitation will not be
applicable to a discharger within that subcategory if the particular discharger has
obtained a variance. For a discussion of variances, see notes 60-89 and accompany-
ing text infra.
51. For a discussion of the NPDES permit system, see note 32 and accompany-
ing text supra.
52. 33 U.S.C. § 1369(b)(1) (1982). These determinations by the Administrator
are only reviewable by the circuit court within 90 days after the Administrator's
actions. Id Review based on an application filed after the 90 day period is available
only if the grounds for such review arose within the 90 day period. Id As of Novem-
ber 1, 1976, seven circuits had reviewed BPT and BAT § 301 effluent limitations
under § 409 for 11 different industries. La Pierre, supra note 30, at 818. Of these 11
sets of limitations, the circuits remanded for reconsideration or reregulation the bulk
of seven sets, upheld the bulk of three sets and upheld all of the limitations in only
one set. Id
The Administrator's decision to veto a state permit is considered a denial of a
permit and is therefore directly reviewable in the appropriate circuit court. See
Crown Simpson Pulp Co. v. Costle, 445 U.S. 193 (1980) (per curiam). Similarly the
decision to veto a state granted variance is also treated as a denial of a permit. See
Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. EPA, 671 F.2d 1235, 1239 (9th Cir. 1972) (affirming EPA
veto of state approved variance). On the other hand, the Administrator's failure to
veto a state-issued permit is not "issuing or denying a permit" by the Administrator
and therefore cannot be reviewed under § 509. See Save the Bay, Inc. v. Administra-
tor of the EPA, 556 F.2d 1282, 1290-96 (5th Cir. 1977) (the failure to veto, although
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the state governments, 53 or private citizens.54 To date the bulk of the en-
forcement actions have been brought by the federal government, despite evi-
dence that Congress intended the states to be the primary enforcers. 55
C. Variance Provisions Under the Act
Although national technology-based effluent limitations appear inflexi-
ble, a certain degree of flexibility is contemplated in their formulation as
not reviewable in Federal Circuit Courts of Appeal under the Clean Water Act, may
be reviewable in federal district court under the Administrative Procedure Act).
After the 90 day period of reviewability any issue that could have been reviewed
under § 509(b)(1) is expressly precluded from review "in any civil or criminal pro-
ceeding for enforcement." 33 U.S.C. § 1369(b)(2) (1982). The "issuance or denial"
date which starts the 90 day challenge period is the date that the discharger receives
effective notice of such "issuance or denial." See Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. EPA, 671
F.2d 1235, 1239-40 (9th Cir. 1982) (holding petitioner's challenge was timely under
§ 509 even though it was received 96 days after EPA denial of the permit variance
because it was received within 90 days of effective notice of denial).
53. 33 U.S.C. § 1319 (1982). The federal and state enforcement provisions of
the Act are found in § 309. Id. When the Administrator determines that a source is
not in compliance with either a state-issued or a federally-issued permit or one of the
effluent limitations under the Act, the Administrator can issue a compliance order
pursuant to § 309(a)(2) or bring a civil action against the source pursuant to
§ 309(b). Id In the case of a state-issued permit the Administrator may either bring
direct enforcement or he may notify the State to allow state enforcement. Id§ 1319(a)(1). If the state does not bring an action within 30 days of notice of the
discharger's violation the Administrator "shall" bring direct enforcement. Id. Possi-
ble remedies under the Act include compliance orders, civil penalties, and criminal
penalties for willful violations. Id § 1319. For an in-depth discussion of enforcement
under the Clean Water Act, see Comment, Federal Water Pollution Laws.- A Critical
Lack of Enforcement by the Environmental Protection Agency, 20 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 945
(1983). See also F. GRAD, supra note 28, § 3.03[ 10], at 3-317 to -342. The enforcement
provisions in the Clean Water Act were drawn extensively from the enforcement pro-
cedures in the Clean Air Act. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 1972, supra note 2, at 1481.
54. 33 U.S.C. § 1365 (1982). Private citizens are expressly granted a cause of
action against dischargers for violations of effluent limitations or compliance orders.
Id § 1365(a)(1). Citizens may also bring suit against the Administrator to force
him/her to perform a nondiscretionary act. Id. § 1365(a)(2). See Natural Resources
Defense Council v. EPA, 8 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 2120 (D.D.C. 1976) (action to
force the Administrator to perform his nondiscretionary duty of regulating toxic pol-
lutants). The United States District Courts are granted jurisdiction over these citizen
suits without regard to the amount in controversy or the citizenship of the parties. 33
U.S.C. § 1365(a) (1982). Citizen suits for enforcement are not private actions for
damages, but for vindication of a public right. See Middlesex County Sewerage
Auth. v. National Sea Clammer's Ass'n., 453 U.S. 1 (1981) (there is no private right
of action under the Clean Water Act). For a general discussion of undue restriction
on citizen enforcement under the Act, see Comment, supra note 53, at 954-56.
55. See LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 1972, supra note 2, at 1482 (Congress intended
that the "great volume of enforcement actions be brought by the State"). There are
various reasons why state enforcement of the Clean Water Act has not lived up to
expectations: (1) only states with permit programs can prosecute permit violators;
(2) there is a strong political desire to avoid antagonizing industry; and (3) there are
difficulties tied to the interstate nature of water pollution. Comment, supra note 53,
at 951.
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well as in their application.5 6 Formulation of each technology-based limita-
tion involves some consideration of cost. 57 In addition, individual industries
may be categorized and subcategorized until a "national uniform limita-
tion" includes only a handful of dischargers.5 8 Moreover, the effluent limita-
tions themselves are flexible in that the limits are normally applied on a
monthly average basis with allowance for much larger daily discharges. 59
The Clean Water Act contains variance or modification 60 provisions
which may alter the applicable effluent limitation in the case of a particular
discharger, usually resulting in a more lenient limitation.6 ' The most signifi-
cant variance provisions for industrial dischargers are the economic and en-
56. See Baum, Legislating Cost-Benefit Analysis: The Federal Water Pollution Control
Act Experience, 9 COLUM. J. ENV. L. 75, 108 (1983) (characterizing the FWPCA stan-
dards of performance as posing no undue economic burdens in comparison to other
environmental legislation).
57. See 33 U.S.C. § 1314(b)(1)(B), (b)(2)(B), (b)(4)(B) (1982). The factors to be
considered in establishing BPT include a comparison of the "total cost of application
of technology in relation to the effluent reduction benefits to be achieved." Id
§ 1314(b)(l)(B). For a discussion of the factors used to set BPT and the relevant
portion of § 304(b)(1)(B), see note 35 supra. The factors to be considered in establish-
ing BAT and BADCT standards include a consideration of the "cost of achieving
such effluent reduction." 33 U.S.C. § 1314(b)(2)(B) (1982). For a discussion of the
factors used to set BAT and BADCT and the relevant portion of § 304(b)(2)(B), see
notes 37 & 46 supra. The BCT standard includes two cost comparisons, one relating
cost to the effluent benefit derived and the other relating a non-POTW source's cost
to the cost a POTW would incur to reach the same level of treatment. 33 U.S.C.
§ 1314(b)(4)(B) (1982). For a discussion of the factors used to set BCT and the rele-
vant portion of § 304(b)(4)(B), see note 40 supra.
58. See 33 U.S.C. § 131 l(b)(2)(A) (1982) (discussing the Administrator's power
to set effluent limitations for "categories and classes of point sources"). See also Wey-
erhaeuser Co. v. Costle, 590 F.2d 1011, 1053 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (16 subcategories with
66 subdivisions, creating, on the average, one set of limitations for every five paper
mills). For other examples of subcategorization, see note 31 supra.
59. See, e.g., American Meat Inst. v. EPA, 526 F.2d 442, 448 (7th Cir. 1975)
("The maximum discharge for any individual day is twice the maximum daily aver-
age for any 30 consecutive days."); 40 C.F.R. § 408.42 (1983) (effluent limitations for
the Non-Remote Alaskan Crab Meat Processing subcategory with a maximum dis-
charge for any one day equal to three times the 30 day average). The EPA need not
make allowance for "excursions," or unintentional discharges in excess of the
monthly average or daily maximum permit limitations. See Corn Refiners Ass'n v.
Costle, 594 F.2d 1223 (8th Cir. 1979) (EPA not required to make provision for "ex-
cursions" in the corn wet milling industry).
60. See 33 U.S.C. § 1311 (c), (g), (i), (k) (1982). The Act refers only to "modifica-
tions," not variances as such. See id At this point, the author uses the terms "modifi-
cation" and "variance" interchangeably. For further discussion of whether a
distinction should be drawn between a modification and a variance, see notes 86, 100
& 105 infra.
61. See 33 U.S.C § 1311(c), (g), (i), (k) (1982). Modifications of BAT limitations
are possible under § 301(c), (g), (i) and (k). Id § 1311(c) (economic variance); id
§ 1311(g) (environmental variance); id. § 1311(i) (municipal time extensions); I.
§ 1311 (k) (extension for use of innovative technology). For a discussion of the distinc-
tion which some suggest should be drawn between a "modification" and a "vari-
ance," see notes 100 & 105 and accompanying text infra. For a discussion of § 301 (c)
and § 301(g) variances, see notes 63-67 & 68-71 and accompanying text in/fa.
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vironmental modifications of BAT effluent limitations for nontoxic
pollutants.
62
Under section 301(c), a source is entitled to an economic variance upon
a showing that the modified requirement "(1) will represent the maximum
use of technology within the economic capability of the owner or operator;
and (2) will result in reasonable further progress toward the elimination of
the discharge of pollutants. '63 This modification of limitations on the basis
of an individual source's economic inability to comply has been limited to
BAT limitations, as opposed to the more lenient BPT limitations. 64 In EPA
62. See 33 U.S.C. § 1311(c) (1982) (economic variance); id. § 1311(g) (environ-
mental variance). Section 301(c) states:
(c) The Administrator may modify the requirements of subsection
(b)(2)(A) of this section with respect to any point source for which a permit
application is filed after July 1, 1977, upon a showing by the owner or oper-
ator of such point source satisfactory to the Administrator that such modi-
fied requirements (1) will represent the maximum use of technology within
the economic capability of the owner or operator; and (2) will result in
reasonable further progress toward the elimination of the discharge of
pollutants.
Id § 1311(c). Section 301(g) states:
(g)(1) The Administrator, with the concurrence of the State, shall mod-
ify the requirements of subsection (b)(2)(A) of this section with respect to
the discharge of any pollutant (other than pollutants identified pursuant to
section 1314(a)(4) of this title, toxic pollutants subject to section 1317(a) of
this title, and the thermal component of discharges) from any point source
upon a showing by the owner or operator of such point source satisfactory
to the Administrator that-
(A) such modified requirements will result at a minimum in
compliance with the requirements of subsection (b)(1) (A) or (C) of this
section, whichever is applicable;
(B) such modified requirements will not result in any additional
requirements on any other point or nonpoint source; and
(C) such modification will not interfere with the attainment or
maintenance of that water quality which shall assure protection of
public water supplies, and the protection and propagation of a bal-
anced population of shellfish, fish, and wildlife, and allow recreational
activities, in and on the water and such modification will not result in
the discharge of pollutants in quantities which may reasonably be an-
ticipated to pose an unacceptable risk to human health or the environ-
ment because of bioaccumulation, persistency in the environment,
acute toxicity, chronic toxicity (including carcinogenicity, mutagenic-
ity, or teratogenicity), or synergistic propensities.
(2) If an owner or operator of a point source applies for a modifica-
tion under this subsection with respect to the discharge of any pollutant,
such owner or operator shall be eligible to apply for modification under
subsection (c) of this section with respect to such pollutant only during the
same time period as he is eligible to apply for a modification under this
subsection.
d. § 1311(g).
63. Id. § 1311(c).
64. EPA v. National Crushed Stone Ass'n., 449 U.S. 64, 68, 72 (1980) (individ-
ual economic inability to comply may warrant a § 301(c) variance from a BAT limi-
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v. National Crushed Stone,65 the Supreme Court explained that section 301(c)
variances are in effect particularized BAT determinations for individual
point sources, since the two 301(c) factors "represent[] . . . the same sort of
economic and technological committment [for the individual source] as the
general BAT standard creates for the class."'66 The National Crushed Stone
Court also stated that "[a]s with the general BAT standard, the [§ 301(c)]
variance assumes that the 1977 BPT standard has been met by the point
source and that the modification represents a commitment of the maximum
resources economically possible to the ultimate goal of eliminating all pollut-
ing discharges."
'67
Under section 301(g) an environmental variance may be granted from
BAT-based effluent limitations whenever the modified requirements will
tation, but is neither a required nor an appropriate consideration in granting a
variance from a BPT limitation).
As previously discussed, the FWPCA was designed to accomplish the implemen-
tation of water pollution control technology by existing point sources in two steps.
For a discussion of the BPT and BAT stages of implementation, see notes 33-40 and
accompanying text supra. In the first step, the Administrator was to set effluent limi-
tations reflecting the best practicable technology currently available (BPT), and indi-
vidual sources were to comply by 1977. See 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b) (1) (A) (1982). The
BPT stage was intended to achieve a national level of minimum compliance by 1977.
See National Crushed Slone, 449 U.S. at 75-78. In determining what control technology
was required under BPT, the Administrator was to compare the technology's "total
cost" (to average sources in a given industry) to its benefits (in terms of effluent re-
duction). See 33 U.S.C. § 1314(b)(1)(B) (1982). See also Baum, supra note 56, at 77,
98-102. For further discussion of the factors considered in setting BPT, see note 35
and accompanying text supra. It was anticipated that certain plants within a given
industry would not be able to afford to meet the minimum level of technology estab-
lished under BPT, and that these plants would be forced to close down. See National
Crushed Stone, 449 U.S. at 75-76, 80-83. However, administrative modification of the
BPT-based limitation was provided where an individual source could show that its
own costs of compliance were considerably greater than the "total cost" to the aver-
age sources considered by EPA in setting the industry standard. See id at 66 & n.2;
see also Note, EPA v. National Crushed Stone Ass'n, 7 COLUMB. J. ENV. L. 165, 168, 173-
74 (1982). For a discussion of the administrative variance based on fundamentally
different factors, see notes 76-89 and accompanying text infra.
In National Crushed Stone, the Supreme Court held that an individual source's
economic inability to comply with BPT standards did not warrant an FDF (funda-
mentally different factor) variance where the cost to that source was not fundamen-
tally different from the cost to other sources in its source category. 449 U.S. at 75-78.
For further discussion of National Crushed Stone's analysis, see notes 82-83 & 85-88 and
accompanying text supra.
Further, the National Crushed Stone Court reaffirmed its position that § 301 (c) var-
iances were not available to modify BPT limitations. 449 U.S. at 73-74 & n. 13 (citing
E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Train, 430 U.S. 112 (1977)). For further discus-
sion of du Pont in the context of fundamentally different factor variances from BPT
limitations, see note 81 and accompanying text infra.
65. 449 U.S. 66 (1980).
66. Id. at 74.
67. Id. For further discussion of National Crushed Stone, see notes 82-83 & 85-88
and accompanying text infta. See also F. GRAD supra note 28, at § 3.03[4][h], at 3-180
to -183; Note, supra note 64; Note, supra note 37.
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(1) meet BPT or more stringent water quality standards, 68 (2) will not result
in any additional requirements on other dischargers, 6 9 and (3) will not inter-
fere with the Act's fishable/swimmable goal 70 or pose an "unacceptable"
risk to human health or the environment.
7 1
In the context of toxic pollutants, however, Congress expressed an in-
tent to impose firm standards: section 301(l), added in 1977,72 expressly
prohibits the "modification '73 of any requirements for toxic pollutants,
7 4
including BAT-based effluent limitations.
75
D. Fundamentally Difrent Factor (FDF) Variance
1. Validity
Despite these express variance provisions in the Clean Water Act, the
most commonly employed and litigated variance procedure is not statutory
but administrative, created by the EPA under its section 501 rulemaking
authority. 76 In 1974, in response to public comments that proposed BPT-
based effluent limitations were too inflexible, the EPA began to include
"Fundamentally Different Factor" (FDF) variance provisions in all BPT ef-
68. 33 U.S.C. § 1311(g)(1)(A) (1982).
69. Id § 1311(g)(1)(B).
70. Id § 1251(a)(2). For the text of§ 101(a), see note 28 supra.
71. 33 U.S.C. § 131 (g)(1)(C) (1982). Section 301(g) variances are termed envi-
ronmental variances because of the water quality and health factors considered. For
further discussion of § 301 (g) variances, see Kalur, //llJudicial Error Allow Industrial
Point Sources to Avoid BPT and Perhaps BA T Later? A Story of Good Intentions, Bad Dictum,
and Ugly Consequences, 7 ECOL. L. Q. 955, 983-85 (1979).
72. See LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 1977, supra note 40, at 460. Senator Muskie
stated that a "toxic effluent standard applies to the pollutant per se and cannot be
exceeded by any source of that pollutant unless the Administrator makes a separate
categorical determination." Id Section 301(1) would not have been necessary prior
to 1977 because toxic pollutants were primarily regulated with health-based limita-
tions before the 1977 amendments. Health-based limitations are based on the effect a
pollutant has on the environment or human health. See id. See also 33 U.S.C. § 1317
(1982) (regulating toxic pollutants with standards based on toxicity). Technology-
based standards, however, are based on a particular type of technology applied to an
individual pollutant in a class or category of sources. See id § 1311(b)(2)(A) (1982)
(BAT technology). For further discussion of the regulation of toxic pollutants
through health-based and technology-based limitations, see notes 47-49 supra.
73. For a discussion of the term "modification" as used in § 301(/) and its rela-
tion to the term "variance," see notes 100 & 105 and accompanying text infia.
74. For the definition of "toxic pollutant" under the Act, see note 47 supra. For
a discussion of the regulation of toxic pollutants under the Act, see notes 47-49 and
accompanying text supra.
75. 33 U.S.C. § 1311(l) (1982). This section states that "[t]he Administrator
may not modify any requirement of this section as it applies to any specific pollutant
which is on the toxic pollutant list under section 1317(a)(1) of this title." Id.
76. See 33 U.S.C. § 1361(a) (1982) ("[tjhe Administrator is authorized to pre-
scribe such regulations as are necessary to carry out his functions under this
Chapter").
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fluent limitation regulations. 77 Under an FDF variance a discharger may be
subject to stricter or more lenient provisions78 than those applicable to his
class or category upon a showing that "factors relating to the equipment or
facilities involved, the process applied, or other such factors related to such
discharger are fundamentally different from the factors considered in the
establishment of the guidelines."
'79
The Supreme Court, in E. I du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Tran,80 indi-
cated that a variance provision was a necessary component to single number
BPT-based limitations for classes and categories of point sources.8' This in-
77. See, e.g., 39 Fed. Reg. 28,926-27 (1974). This typical FDF variance provision
states:
In establishing the limitations set forth in this section, EPA took into
account all information it was able to collect, develop and solicit with re-
spect to factors ...which can affect the industry sub-categorization and
effluent levels established. . . . An individual discharger or other inter-
ested person may submit evidence to the Regional Administrator (or to the
State, if the State has the authority to issue NPDES permits) that factors
relating to the equipment or facilities involved, the process applied, or other
such factors related to such discharger are fundamentally di erent from the
factors considered in the establishment of the guidelines. . . . If such fun-
damentally different factors are found to exist, the Regional Administrator
or the State shall establish for the discharger effluent limitations in the
NPDES permit either more or less stringent than the limitations established
herein, to the extent dictated by such fundamentally different factors. Such
limitations must be approved by the Administrator of the Environmental
Protection Agency. The Administrator may approve or disapprove such
limitations, specify other limitations, or initiate proceedings to revise these
regulations.
Id. at 28,926 (emphasis added).
78. See note 77 supra. As an "interested party" under an FDF variance provi-
sion, a private citizen or environmental group could theoretically cause stricter efflu-
ent limitations to be applied to a discharger based on an FDF variance. See 39 Fed.
Reg. 28,926 (1974) (the Administrator shall establish effluent limitations "either
more or less stringent ...to the extent dictated by such fundamentally different
factors"). However, this would appear to be a "most unlikely possibility, given: (1)
the intimate familiarity with the production process and cleanup state-of-the-art that
would be required to force alteration; and (2) the general lack of knowledge of partic-
ular plant cleanup status that exists outside the administrative process." Kalur, supra
note 71, at 962 n.33.
79. 39 Fed. Reg. 28,926 (1974). For the full text of this early FDF regulation,
see note 77 supra. For an example of a newer FDF variance promulgated for pretreat-
ment standards, see 40 C.F.R. § 420.13 (1983) (FDF variances from pretreatment
standards).
80. 430 U.S. 112 (1977).
81. Id. at 128. For a discussion of the Administrator's power to promulgate sin-
gle number BPT effluent limitations, see note 35 supra.
The Court stated: "We conclude that the statute authorizes the 1977 [BPT]
limitations as well as the 1983 [BAT] limitations to be set by regulation, so long as
some allowance is made for variations in individual plants, as EPA has done by in-
cluding a variance clause in its 1977 [BPT] limitations." 430 U.S. at 128. However,
the Court went on to say that review of the variance procedure promulgated by EPA
was premature at that time. Id. n.19. See National Crushed Stone, 449 U.S. at 72-74 &
nn.12-13 (implicitly assuming FDF variances are valid by stating that Du Pont re-
quired variances for BPT and that § 301(c) variances are not applicable to BPT).
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dication was strengthened by the Court's later decision in EPA v. National
Crushed Stone Association.82 In National Crushed Stone, the Court said that Du
Pont had required a variance provision for single number limitations and had
assumed that section 301(c) variances were not available for BPT limita-
tions.8 3 The courts of appeals which have directly considered the validity of
FDF variances have found the FDF variance procedure to be valid.
8 4
2. Relevant Factors
The Supreme Court in National Crushed Stone held that a source's eco-
nomic capability to comply with BPT limitations is not a proper considera-
tion in an FDF variance determination.85 The Court based this decision on
two factors. First, section 301(c) variances, which include considerations of
Neither party to the case had briefed or argued issues relating to approval of FDF
variances. See Kalur, supra note 71, at 973. The Supreme Court also held that no
variance provision need be provided for new sources, because Congress intended new
source limits to be absolute prohibitions; and no variance is appropriate where "max-
imum feasible control" is sought. 430 U.S. at 138. For criticism of what is seen as
inconsistent treatment for new source limitations, see Kalur, supra note 71, at 973-74.
FDF variance provisions had been included in most effluent limitations, since at
least 1974. See 39 Fed. Reg. 28,926-27 (1974) (presentation of policy to include FDF
variance provisions in effluent limitations promulgated).
82. 449 U.S. 64 (1980). In National Crushed Stone the respondents were industries
engaged in the coal mining industry and a portion of the mineral mining and
processing industry. Id. at 66. The respondents had challenged the Administrator's
interpretation of the Act and the FDF variance clauses as being too restrictive in
failing to include § 301(c) factors. Id. at 68-69.
83. 449 U.S. at 72-74 & nn.12-13. Given these two statements, (1) that BPT
limits need variances to be valid, and (2) that 301(c) variances are not proper for
BPT, the Court seems to have assumed the validity of FDF variances in general
without directly deciding the issue. See id
84. See Natural Resources Defense Council v. EPA, 537 F.2d 642 (2d Cir. 1976)
(upholding the validity of the FDF variance provision based on the Fourth Circuit's
Du Pont analysis, the need for a "safety valve," and the unworkability of what it saw
as the only alternative, extensive recategorization); American Petroleum Inst. v.
EPA, 540 F.2d 1023 (10th Cir. 1976) (upholding the validity of FDF variances in
general, based on Natural Resources Defense Council and the Administrator's general
rulemaking authority under § 501); E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Train, 541
F.2d 1018 (4th Cir. 1976) (upholding single number BPT limitations based in part on
the availability of FDF variances), modifed, 430 U.S. 112 (1977).
85. 449 U.S. at 72. The National Crushed Stone Court held that the economic
capability of a discharger to comply need not be taken into account in a variance
determination. Id. The Court stated that the cost of pollution control is considered
in setting the BPT effluent limitation and therefore every BPT limitation "represents
a conclusion by the Administrator that the costs imposed on the industry are worth
the benefits in pollution reduction .. "Id at 76. Adopting the EPA's interpreta-
tion of the Act, the Court indicated that a plant would secure a BPT variance by
showing that its compliance costs were fundamentally different, "x times greater,"
than those considered by EPA. Id. at 68 n.5. By contrast, a variance would not be
available if a plant simply could not afford to comply. Id. Justice White's opinion
pointed out that Congress expected some dischargers to close because of inability or
unwillingness to incur necessary pollution control expenditures. Id. at 80 (citing LEG-
ISLATIVE HISTORY 1972, supra note 2, at 1282 ("many marginal plants may be forced
to close"); id. at 231 (operators may decide to go out of business rather than meet the
[Vol. 29: p. 771
20
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 29, Iss. 3 [1984], Art. 8
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol29/iss3/8
1983-84] THIRD CIRCUIT REVIEW
economic capability, are limited to BAT limitations.86 Second, the factors
necessary for a section 301(c) variance are inconsistent with BPT limita-
tions.8 7 The Court also stated that the legislative history of the Act did not
support economic capability considerations for FDF variances1 8
Although the Supreme Court has not addressed the issue, the circuits
agree that the water quality of the body of water into which pollutants are
discharged is not a relevant consideration in the FDF variance
determination.8 9
BPT limitations)). To alleviate this hardship, Congress provided for a low cost loan
program for small businesses and protection for employees. 419 U.S. at 81, 82.
The decision by the Supreme Court in National Crushed Stone eliminated a conflict
among the circuits as to whether economic ability to comply should be considered in
a BPT variance determination. See Note, supra note 64, at 169-73 (discussing the
conflicting positions of the Fourth Circuit and the District of Columbia Circuit).
86. 33 U.S.C. § 1311(c) (1982). Section 301(c) specifically refers to modifica-
tions of § 301(b)(2)(A), the section on BAT limitations. Id. For a discussion of
§ 301(c), see notes 61-64 and accompanying text supra.
87. 449 U.S. at 74-75. The factors listed in § 301(c) "parallel" the factors used
to set BAT, thus creating for the point source the same sort of economic and techno-
logical commitment as the general BAT standard creates for a class. Id. at 79. No
such parallel relationship exists between the § 301 (c) factors and BPT limitations, in
that BPT limitations require neither prior standards nor the "maximum use of tech-
nology within the economic capability of the owner or operator," both of which are
required to obtain § 301(c) variance. d. at 75. The Court also deferred to the EPA's
interpretation of the FDF variance as an "individualized definition" of BPT, rather
than an exception to BPT. Id at 79 n.18; see Metal Finshers, 719 F.2d at 646 (§ 301
(c) modifications serve the same purpose as FDF variances).
88. 449 U.S. at 68 n.5, 85. The total cost of the application technology, in rela-
tion to the effluent reduction benefits derived, is one of the factors used in
§ 304(b)(l)(B) to set BPT limitations. 33 U.S.C. § 1314(b)(1)(B) (1982). Since Na-
tional Crushed Stone directs that the only factors that can be considered in an FDF
variance are those factors used in setting the limitation, a source's total cost may be
considered in a variance determination, but only if it is fundamentally different than
the total cost considered by EPA in setting the BPT limitation. See 449 U.S. at 68 n.5
(statement of EPA's position on consideration of total cost); id. at 84-85 (accepting
the EPA's interpretation of the Act).
89. See Appalachian Power Co. v. EPA, 671 F.2d 801 (4th Cir. 1982) (Appalach-
ian III); Crown Simpson Pulp Co. v. Costle, 642 F.2d 323, 316 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
454 US. 1053 (1981). The Supreme Court's decision in National Crushed Stone did not
deal directly with considerations of receiving water quality, but only with considera-
tions of economic ability. See Crown Simpson Pulp, 642 F.2d at 326 (National Crushed
Stone only "implicitly" precludes consideration of receiving water quality). Following
National Crushed Stone, circuit courts reasoned that the Supreme Court's holding, that
the only factors which can be considered in an FDF variance determination are the
factors used in setting the effluent limitation from which the variance is sought, indi-
cated that receiving water quality may not be considered in an FDF determination
from BPT limitations, since receiving water quality is not considered in setting BPT.
See, e.g., Appalachian Power Co. v. EPA, 671 F.2d 801, 808 (4th Cir. 1982) (Appalach-
ian III) (the Supreme Court's decision in "National Crushed Stone completely undercuts
• . . required consideration of receiving water quality .. "); Crown Simpson Pulp
Co. v. Costle, 642 F.2d 323, 326 (9th Cir.) (inconsistent with Act to base variances on
receiving water quality, relying in part on National Crushed Stone), cert. denied, 454 U.S.
1053 (1981).
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3. FDF Variances for Toxic Pollutants
The 1977 amendments to the FWPCA imposed stringent requirements
for the implementation of technological limitations on toxic pollutants.90
Section 307(a)(1) requires the Administrator to publish a list of pollutants
designated as toxic. 9 1 Once he designates a pollutant as toxic, the Adminis-
trator is required to establish technology-based limitations based on a BAT
standard for that particular pollutant. 92 Furthermore, the 1977 amend-
ments added section 301(1), which states: "The Administrator may not mod-
t any requirement of this section as it applies to any. . .[designated] toxic
pollutant. .... -93
Recently two courts of appeals have addressed the question of whether
section 301 (1) precludes the issuance of an FDF variance to direct or indirect
dischargers of toxic pollutants. 94 In Appalachian Power Co. v. Train (Appalach-
tan IO,95 the Fourth Circuit decided that an FDF variance which had been
90. 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b)(2)(c)(b) (1982) (imposing technology-based effluent
limitations). Prior to the 1977 amendments, the Act regulated toxic pollutants only
with § 307 health-based effluent limitations. Id. § 1317. The health-based limita-
tions proved too cumbersome to promulgate, so EPA generally did not use its § 307
authority. See Natural Resources Defense Council v. Train, 8 Env't. Rep. Cas.
(BNA) 2120 (D.D.C. 1976) ("Flannery settlement"). The "Flannery settlement"
forced EPA to promulgate best available technology-based effluent limitations for a
list of 65 toxic pollutants. Id. at 2124, 2129-30. The "Flannery settlement" and the
list of 65 toxic pollutants to be regulated were accepted by Congress and codified in
the 1977 amendments. See Clean Water Act of 1977, Pub. L. 95-217, § 26(b),.91 Stat.
1567, 1582-90 (1977) (codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. § 131 l(b)(2)(C), (D) (1982));
see also LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 1977, supra note 40, at 326-38. For further discussion
of the regulation of toxic pollutants both before and after the 1977 amendments, see
notes 47-49 and accompanying text supra.
91. See 33 U.S.C. § 1317(a)(1) (1982). For a discussion of how the "Flannery
settlement" started the use of this pollutant list and how the list may be lengthened
or shortened, see note 47 supra.
92. See 33 U.S.C. § 131 1(b)(2)(C), (D) (1982). Prior to the 1977 amendments,
the Act did not require the application of BAT-based effluent limitations to toxic
pollutants. See notes 47 & 90 supra.
93. 33 U.S.C. § 1311(l) (1982) (emphasis supplied).
94. National Ass'n. of Metal Finishers v. EPA, 719 F.2d 624 (3d Cir. 1983)
(§ 301() precludes issuance of FDF variances to indirect dischargers of toxic pollu-
tants), cert. grantedsub nom. Chemical Mfrs. Ass'n. v. Natural Resources Defense Coun-
cil, Inc., 104 S. Ct. 2167 (1984); Appalachian Power Co. v. Train, 620 F.2d 1040 (4th
Cir. 1980) (Appalachian Ii) (§ 30 1(1) prohibition against modification of toxic pollu-
tant limitations does not prohibit FDF variances). For a discussion of Metal Finrehers
and Appalachtan If, see notes 102-10 & 95-101 respectively and accompanying text
infta.
This issue concerns both direct discharge and pretreatment limitations because
many of the pollutants regulated in pretreatment limits are toxic pollutants. Metal
Fiishers, 719 F.2d at 645 n.25 (to date the administrator has focused his pretreatment
regulations effort on toxic pollutants). For further discussion of pretreatment regula-
tions' relationship to toxic pollutants, see note 44 supra.
95. 620 F.2d 1040 (4th Cir. 1980). In Appalachian II, certain utilities contended
that the Administrator had not followed an earlier court mandate to consider
§ 301(c) factors in the proposed regulation. d. at 1044 (citing Appalachian Power
Co. v. Train, 545 F.2d 1351 (4th Cir. 1976) (Appalachian 1)). In Appalachian I, the
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granted prior to the 1977 amendments was still valid after the 1977 amend-
ments to the Act. 96 The case was unusual in that it dealt with a toxic pollu-
tant originally regulated, prior to 1977, by a BPT-based effluent
limitation.
97
The Fourth Circuit based its decision that section 301(/) did not invali-
date the FDF variance from BPT standards on two grounds. First, the court
felt that the 1977 amendments, in imposing the more exacting BAT stan-
dard of technological controls, did not evidence a congressional intent to
operate retroactively. 98 Thus, the court was reluctant to invoke the subse-
quently-enacted section 301 (1) prohibition to invalidate the FDF variance. 99
Second, the court found that the terms of section 301(l) were not clearly
applicable to FDF variances from BPT limitations.'0 0 In light of this ambi-
guity, the court gave weight to the EPA's proposed interpretation, that the
term "modified" was a term of art which referred to the Act's express modifi-
Fourth Circuit held that § 301(c) factors had to be considered in an FDF determina-
tion. See Appalachian I, 545 F.2d at 1359. But see EPA v. National Crushed Stone
Ass'n, 449 U.S. 64 (1980) (§ 301(c) factors should not be considered in an FDF vari-
ance determination). In Appalachian 11, the EPA had included BPT effluent limita-
tions for toxics in the regulations promulgated for the steam electric industry. 620
F.2d at 1047.
96. 620 F.2d at 1047.
97. Id Prior to 1977, toxic pollutants were traditionally regulated under the
health based limitations of § 307. 33 U.S.C. § 1317 (1982). Contrary to general toxic
standards the "Flannery settlement" forced the EPA to promulgate BPT-based tech-
nology standards for pretreatment regulation of eight particular categories of dis-
chargers. Metal Fiishers, 719 F.2d at 634. For further discussion of the health-based
toxic limitations prior to 1977, the "Flannery settlement" and the 1977 amendments
which led to technology based effluent limitations for toxic pollutants, see note 90
supra.
98. 620 F.2d at 1047-48. The court stated that there was no indication that the
1977 amendments were intended to "operate retroactively so as to possibly retract
any variance previously issued to an industry which just happened to be discharging
toxic substances, or to obliterate the known practice of EPA in not excluding toxic
substances from those pollutants for which a variance might be granted under BPT
effluent limitations." Id. at 1047. The court added that in general the retroactive
application of a statute is not favored. Id. (citing Union Pac. R.R. v. Laramie Stock-
yards Co., 231 U.S. 190, 199 (1913) (statute allowing adverse possession by railroads
will not be given retrospective applications)).
99. 620 F.2d at 1047-48.
100. Id. The court stated:
[Section] 301(l) speaks to preventing the modification of any require-
ment of § 301 as it applies to any specific pollutant on the toxic pollutant
list. On its face, it might thus be said to apply to such parts of the statute as
§ 301(c) which speak of modiytg requirements for BAT limitations. ...
While this may well be an indication of Congressional intent that the stat-
ute should be read as EPA reads it, that § 301(1) applies only to those sec-
tions of § 301 which in terms permit modification, in all events the best that
can be said for § 301(1) is that it is not clear. That being true, we give
weight to the construction the administering agency has placed upon the
statute, and, when we consider that retroactivity is not favored, we are of
opinion [sic] that § 301(1) does not apply so as to require the exclusion of
toxic substances from BPT variance provisions.
Id (emphasis supplied by the court).
1983-84]
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cation provisions, but did not include FDF variances. 10 '
In 1983 the Third Circuit considered an FDF variance granted for toxic
pollutants in the context of pretreatment regulations. 102 In National Associa-
lion of Metal Finishers v. EPA, 0 3 the Natural Resources Defense Council
(NRDC) contended that an FDF variance provision for pretreatment stan-
dards for toxic pollutants was contrary to section 301 (1)'s express prohibition
on "modification" of toxic pollutant regulations.' 0 4 The Third Circuit held
that section 301(l)'s prohibition extended to variations from toxic limitations
under an FDF variance.1
0 5
The Metal Finishers court noted that the Supreme Court, in National
Crushed Stone, had stated that section 301(c) modifications of BAT limits
"serve the same function as FDF variances of BPT limits."' 1 6 Thus, the
101. Id.
102. National Ass'n. of Metal Finishers v. EPA, 719 F.2d 624 (3d Cir. 1983), cert.
granted, sub nor. Chemical Mfrs. Ass'ns. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.,
104 S. Ct. 2167 (1984). The pretreatment regulations at issue in Metal Fh'ishers were
for the electroplating point source category. Id at 632. The categorical pretreatment
standards at issue in Metal Finishers were set at a "BPT-level" analagous to direct
dischargers pursuant to the consent decree in Natural Resources Defense Council v. Train,
as modified. Id. at 634 (citing Natural Resources Defense Council v. Train, 8 Env't Rep.
Cas. (BNA) 2120 (D.D.C. 1976) (as modified)). For a discussion of the Natural Re-
sources Defense Council v. Train consent decree, known as the "Flannery settlement," see
note 47 supra. The Administrator was to subsequently promulgate categorical pre-
treatment standards for all categories of pollutants listed in the consent decree. 719
F.2d at 634. In Metal Ftzhers, the Natural Resources Defense Council and a number
of "industrial petitioners" challenged several aspects of the pretreatment regulations,
including: (1) the definition of "interference" and "pass through"; (2) the definition
of "new sources"; (3) the FDF variance provision; (4) a removal credits provision; and
(5) the combined waste stream formula. Id at 638.
The court's discussion of the inapplicability of FDF variances to toxic pollutant
limitations appears to apply equally to BPT and BAT regulations for toxics, since
Metal Fishers dealt with BPT limitations for toxics but spoke of the soon-to-be-
promulgated BAT limitations. See id. at 643 (dealing with a regulation under which
"direct dischargers may obtain FDF variances from BPT and BAT effluent
limitations").
103. 719 F.2d 624 (3d Cir. 1983), cert. granted sub nom. Chemical Mfrs. Ass'n. v.
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 104 S. Ct. 2167 (1984).
104. 719 F.2d at 643. The NRDC challenged the Administrator's authority to
provide for any variances from categorical pretreatment standards. Id at 644. In
addition, NRDC asserted that even if such authority existed it could not be used to
allow variances for toxic pollutants. Id. at 645 (citing 33 U.S.C. § 1311(/) (1982)).
Since the Court found the variance provision invalid, as applied to toxic pollutants, it
did not address the Administrator's inherent authority to promulgate variance provi-
sions for pretreatment standards. Id. at 645.
105. Id at 645-46. The Metal Finishers court found that Congress did not intend
the term " 'modification' as a term of art so as to exclude variance provisions from
the proscription of section 301(1)." Id. at 646. In support, it relied on the statements
of two of the major proponents of the Act who had used the terms "waiver" and
"modification" interchangeably. Id. (citing LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 1977, supra note
45, at 328-29 (statement of Senator Roberts); id. at 458 (statement of Senator
Muskie)).
106. 719 F.2d at 646 (citing National Crushed Stone, 449 U.S. at 74). The Third
Circuit noted that the National Crushed Stone Court described both § 301(c) modifica-
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Third Circuit rejected the EPA's effort to distinguish section 301(c) modifi-
cations from FDF variances.' 0 7 Judge Hunter reasoned: "If Congress were
willing to prohibit section 301(c) modifications where toxic pollutants are
concerned, it is difficult to imagine why Congress would have permitted sim-
ilar FDF variances for those same pollutants."' 08
In contrast to the Fourth Circuit in Appalachian II, the Third Circuit
found section 301(l) clear in its intent to forbid all modifications of toxic
pollutants. ' 09 The Third Circuit concluded: "Given the clear congressional
concern throughout the 1977 amendments for discharges of toxic pollutants,
we hold that FDF variances for toxic pollutant discharges are forbidden by
the Act."'' 0
On November 15, 1983, in response to the Third Circuit's decision in
Metal Finishers, EPA Administrator William Ruckelshaus proposed that sec-
tion 30 1(1) of the Act be amended so as to authorize FDF variances for toxic
pollutants."' The Administrator claimed the variance was "essential" to
the rulemaking process because it enabled the EPA to focus its data-gather-
ing and analysis on more traditional facilities, and to avoid the need for
extensive subcategorization."1 2 Ruckelshaus also argued that the FDF vari-
tions of BAT limitations and FDF variances of BPT limitations as ad hoc determina-
tions of the applicable technology-based effluent limitations which reflected the same
economic and technological commitment as the limitation generally applicable to the
class. Id
107. 719 F.2d at 646.
108. Id
109. Id (citing Appalachian II, 620 F.2d at 1046-48). For a discussion of the
Fourth Circuit's interpretation of § 301(/) as unclear, see note 100 and accompany-
ing text supra. The Third Circuit stated: "Because we find that section 301(1) is
clear, we must disagree. Section 301 (1) forbids modifications, and FDF variances are
no less modifications than those provisions indisputably prohibited by that section."
719 F.2d at 646.
110. 719 F.2d at 646.
111. See [Current Developments] ENV'T REP. (BNA) 1307, 1307 (November 18,
1983). Administrator Ruckelshaus presented the Administration's proposals for
amending the Clean Water Act to the House Public Works and Transportation Sub-
committee on Water Resources. Id This proposed amendment reads as follows:
(1) The Administrator may not modify any requirement of this sec-
tion as it applies to any specific pollutant which is on the toxic pollutant list
under section 307(a)(1) of this Act, except that lhe Administrator may modify such
a requirement to the extent justfied by thefact that a direct or indirect discharger is, in
terms of thefactors specifaed in Section 304(b), fundamentally difrent from the direct
and indirect dischargers considered in developing applicable effluent limitations guide-
hnes and pretreatment standards under this section and section 307(b).
Id at 1355 (emphasis added to indicate proposed amendment; cf 33 U.S.C. § 1311 (1)
(1982) (present version of § 30 1(1)).
112. See [Current Developments] ENV'T REP. (BNA) at 1307. The Administra-
tor concluded:
The alternative to allowing the variance is to develop a separate sub-
category within the regulation for a facility affected by different factors
from those considered for the broader category.
"The subcategorization approach will add further complications and
require potentially substantial additional time in developing what are al-
25
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ances would reduce the legal vulnerability of the rules by acting as an ad-
ministrative safety valve.'
1 3
On December 19, 1983, one of the Metal Ftnishers intervenors requested
that the United States Supreme Court grant certiorari and reverse the Third
Circuit's decision that FDF variances may not be applied to toxic pollu-
tants.1 4 On February 17, 1984, the EPA petitioned the Court to grant certi-
orari and reverse the Third Circuit on the same issue. 115 The Supreme
Court granted certiorari in both cases.'16
III. THE IMPROPRIETY OF FDF VARIANCES FOR Toxic POLLUTANTS
It is submitted that allowing FDF variances for toxic pollution limita-
tions under the FWPCA is contrary to the text of the Act, Congressional
intent, and sound policy, for a variety of reasons. As the Third Circuit case
of National Association of Metal Finishers v. EPA1 7 succinctly pointed out,
ready extraordinarily complex and detailed regulations," Ruckelshaus
testified.
Id
113. Id. Ruckelshaus argued that the amendment is necessary because "the pro-
cedure reduces the legal vulnerability of the national standards by allowing an ad-
ministrative remedy for facilities that cannot meet the standards because of factors
not considered in the rulemaking." Id. For a discussion of the validity of the "safety
valve" argument for allowing variances, see note 133 and accompanying text infra.
For a discussion of the advantages of increased efficiency gained by the EPA in al-
lowing variances, see notes 134-37 and accompanying text infra.
114. National Ass'n. of Metal Finishers v. EPA, 719 F.2d 624 (3d Cir. 1983), cert
grantedsub nom. Chemical Mfrs. Ass'n v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 104
S. Ct. 2167 (1984). The questions presented in the petition for certiorari by the
Chemical Manufacturers Association are as follows:
(1) Is court of appeals' decision contrary to this Court's holding in E.
I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Train, 430 U.S. 112 (1977), that effluent
limitations may be "set by regulation, so long as some allowance is made for
variations in individual plants, as EPA has done by including a variance
clause" in its regulations? (2) Was court below incorrect in ruling that
§ 301 (/) of Clean Water Act precludes granting of variance for toxic pollu-
tants to atypical plants that can demonstrate factors not considered by EPA
in establishing national technology-based regulations? (3) Is decision be-
low, by removing EPA's discretion to deal with atypical situations either by
individual orders or by rulemaking, contrary to this Court's decision in SEC
v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194 (1947)?
52 U.S.L.W. 3787, 3787 (U.S. May 1, 1984) (Nos. 83-1013). See SEC v. Chenery
Corp., 332 U.S. 194 (1947) (where the facts are undisputed the court may disturb the
conclusion of an administrative agency only when it lacks any rational and statutory
foundation). For a discussion of Du Pont, see notes 80-81 and accompanying text
supra. For a discussion of the factors relevant in an FDF determination, see notes 85-
89 and accompanying text supra.
115. 52 U.S.L.W. 3726 (U.S. April 3, 1984) (No. 83-1399), cert. granted, 52
U.S.L.W. 3787 (U.S. May 1, 1984) (Nos. 83-1373). The question presented by the
EPA in the petition is whether § 301(1) bars the EPA from granting FDF variances
for toxic pollutants.
116. 52 U.S.L.W. 3787 (U.S. May 1, 1984) (Nos. 83-1013, 83-1373).
117. 719 F.2d 624 (3d Cir. 1983). For a discussion of Metal Finishers, see notes
102-10 and accompanying text supra.
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neither the text nor the legislative history of the Act authorizes variances for
toxic pollutants.'18 The Metal Finishers court correctly followed National
Crushed Stone 1 9 in recognizing that a section 301(c) "modification" performs
the same function for BAT as the FDF "variance" performs for BPT.
120
Given that the Supreme Court had already determined that section 301(c)
modifications and FDF variances perform the same function, the conclusion
seems inescapable that Congress intended the words of section 301(1) to pre-
clude both in the case of toxic limitations.12' The Fourth Circuit's contrary
holding in Appalachian Power P1 22 is not only distinguishable, 123 but proba-
bly discredited by the Supreme Court's decision in National Crushed Stone. '
2 4
Strong policy reasons for regulating toxic pollutants also militate
against adoption of the proposed amendment authorizing FDF variances for
toxic pollutant limitations. 125 Toxic pollutants, even more than other pollu-
tants, are regulated because of their potential and actual detrimental effects
on man and other living organisms.126 Toxic pollutants are now regulated
primarily with technology-based limitations, because experience has shown
that health-based limitations are very difficult to formulate. 127 Congress'
118. See 33 U.S.C. § 131 l(g) (1982) (environmental variances specifically do not
apply to toxic pollutants); id. § 1311(c) (using "modification" language found in
§ 301(1) prohibition).
119. 449 U.S. 64 (1980). For a discussion of National Crushed Stone, see notes 82-
83 & 85-88 and accompanying text supra.
120. 719 F.2d at 646 (citing National Crushed Stone, 449 U.S. at 79 n.18 (EPA
explanation that variances allow "individualized definition[s]" of the limitations)).
Both variance/modifications create ad hoc technology-based effluent standards, as
the Third Circuit recognized.
121. See 719 F.2d at 646. The Third Circuit properly employed this reasoning
in rejecting EPA's claim that "modification" under § 301 (1) was a term of art which
did not include FDF variances. Id. For further discussion of this argument, see notes
103-04 supra.
122. 620 F.2d 1040 (4th Cir. 1980). For a discussion of Appalachian II, see notes
95-101 and accompanying text supra.
123. See 620 F.2d at 1047. The Fourth Circuit's decision in Appalachian lcan be
interpreted strictly as prohibiting only retrospective application of § 301(l)'s ban on
modification of toxic BPT limitations. See id For a discussion of Appalachian II, see
notes 95-101 and accompanying text supra.
124. See EPA v. National Crushed Stone Ass'n., 449 U.S. 64, 72 (1980) (rejecting
Appalachian II's holding that individual sources' economic ability to comply should
be considered in FDF variance determinations). For a discussion of the economic
ability to comply issue in the context of BPT and BAT, see notes 35 & 37 and accom-
panying text supra. See also Appalachian Power Co. v. Train, 671 F.2d 801 (4th Cir.
1982) (Appalachian III) (following National Crushed Stone).
125. See Metal F)hers, 719 F.2d at 645 ("the elimination of the discharge as
toxic pollutants has always received special emphasis under the Act.") (citing 33
U.S.C. §§ 1251(a)(3), 1362(13) (1982)).
126. See 33 U.S.C. § 1362(13) (1982). Toxic pollutants are defined by the likeli-
hood of their causing "death, disease, behavorial abnormalities, cancer, genetic mu-
tations, physiological malfunctions (including malfunctions in reproduction) or
physical deformations. ... .Id. For the full definition of "toxic pollutant," see note
47 supra.
127. For a discussion of the difficulty EPA had in formulating health-based lim-
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change from a health to technology focus advanced the cause of workable
pollution control.128 However, allowing FDF variances from those technol-
ogy limitations is inconsistent with the underlying health concerns and a step
away from toxic pollution control. 129 The section 301 (/) prohibition shows a
strong congressional intent to deal specifically with toxic pollutants in an
uncompromising manner. 130 Administrator Ruckelshaus' proposed amend-
ment evidences the EPA's belief that section 301 (1) is presently a bar to FDF
variances for toxic pollutants.' 3'
One argument used by proponents of variances in regulations, and reit-
erated by Administrator Ruckelshaus in urging approval of the proposed
authorization of FDF variances for toxic pollutants, is the "safety valve" ar-
gument.' 32 This argument states that a regulation is less vulnerable to legal
attack and declarations of invalidity if it contains an administrative remedy
for facilities which contain factors not considered in the rulemaking
process. 133
itations, see Hall, supra note 47, at 613-16 (background of the "Flannery settlement").
The difficulty EPA had in promulgating the health-based limitations is illustrated by
the "Flannery settlement," which forced EPA to regulate toxic pollutants through
technological limitations. Id For further discussion of the "Flannery settlement", see
note 47 supra. For an in-depth discussion of the practical problems in formulating
health-based standards, see La Pierre, supra note 30, at 799-805.
128. See Cairnes, supra note 4, at 4 (technology-based standards were applied to
toxic pollutants "based on the assumption that the 'practical approach' was the best
way to abate pollution"). Cairnes goes on to point out, however, that technology-
based standards do not consider several important scientific principles which may
determine how a discharge of toxic pollutants affects the environment. Id. at 5.
129. See 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(3) (1982) ("it is the national policy that the dis-
charge of toxic pollutants in toxic amounts be prohibited"). This policy indicates
that the need to control toxic discharges should outweigh the desirability of regula-
tions which accomodate the particular needs of individual polluters. Cf id § 1311 (1)
(prohibiting modifications of limitations on toxic pollutants).
130. Id § 1311(1). For the text of § 301(1), see note 75 supra. The Act specifi-
cally directs the Administrator to promulgate BAT-based effluent limitations for
toxic pollutants. 33 U.S.C. § 131 l(b)(2)(c) (1982). There was litigation over whether
the Act even allowed the Administrator to promulgate BPT-based effluent limita-
tions for conventional pollutants. See Du Pont, 430 U.S. at 128 (the Administrator
may promulgate single-number BPT effluent limitations as long as there is some pro-
vision for a variance).
131. For the text of the proposed change to § 301(1), see note 111 supra.
132. For a discussion of Administrator Ruckelshaus' arguments in favor of au-
thorization for FDF variances for toxic pollutants, see notes 112-13 supra.
133. See National Resources Defense Council v. EPA, 537 F.2d 642 (2d Cir.
1976). The Second Circuit stated that a "limited safety valve permits a more rigor-
ous adherence to an effective regulation." Id. at 647 (quoting Portland Cement
Ass'n. v. Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d 375, 399 (D.C. Cir. 1973), ceri denied, 417 U.S. 921
(1974)). An effluent limitation with the possibility of a variance is less likely to be
challenged in court because: (1) dischargers may apply for variances instead of chal-
lenging the limit, in the process possibly using up all of the limited 90 day period of
review under § 509(b)(1); and (2) dischargers which challenge an effluent limitation
might be less likely to win if they did not attempt to take advantage of the variance
or were denied a variance. See id.
This "safety valve" argument is weakened by the fact that challenges to effluent
[Vol. 29: p. 771
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A stronger argument in support of allowing variances for toxic pollution
standards is one of agency efficiency. 134 If the EPA can concentrate on the
"typical" discharger it can presumably set technology based limitations
more quickly and easily.' 3 5 Such concerns of administrative efficiency must
be balanced against the flexibility available in subcategorization, 36 and the
policy reasons favoring strict toxic standards. 137
Neither of these arguments carries much weight, because whatever is
true of variances from effluent limitations in general' 38 and administrative
efficiency in general is irrelevant to a discussion of variances for toxic pollu-
tants. Congress has clearly demonstrated that it intends to deal specifically
and strictly with toxic pollutants.
13 9
FDF variance provisions should not be used to relieve EPA of its obliga-
tion to conduct investigations and propose a reasonable regulation that is
fair to the category in general. 140 Since strong policy reasons favor general
limitations are already limited by the preclusive effect of § 509(b)(2). 33 U.S.C.
§ 1369(b)(2) (1982). For a discussion of judicial review of EPA action under § 509,
see note 52 and accompanying text supra.
Many effluent limitations that have been challenged in the courts have been
found invalid. See La Pierre, supra note 30, at 818 (listing the number of challenges
and the number of remands to the EPA for repromulgation of effluent limits).
134. For a description of Administrator Ruckelshaus' position that allowing
FDF variances for toxics will be more efficient, see note 112 supra.
135. [Current Developments] ENV'T. REP. (BNA) 1307 (Nov. 18, 1983).
136. See, e.g., Weyerhauser Co. v. Costle, 590 F.2d 1011, 1053 (D.C. Cir. 1978)
(within the pulp and paper industry there were "16 subcategories, divided into 66
subcategories" approximately "one set of limitations to every five mills"). It would
seem that much of the extensive subcategorization that has already been done for
non-toxic effluent limitations will be applicable to toxic effluent limitations. For a
discussion of the extensive subcategorization already in place, see note 50 supra. For a
discussion of subcategorization as a desirable alternative to variances, see note 140
infra.
137. See 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(3) (1982) ("it is the national policy that the dis-
charge of toxic pollutants in toxic amounts be prohibited"). The purpose behind
almost all environmental regulation, the protection of human health and the envi-
ronment, is most urgent in the area of toxic pollution control. See id. § 1362(13) (de-
fining "toxic pollutant"). See also Cairnes, supra note 4, at 2. For the full statutory
definition of "toxic pollutant," see note 47 supra. Congress realized the danger caused
by toxic pollutants and expressed its concern in the 1977 amendments. See LEGISLA-
TIVE HISTORY 1977, supra note 40, at 455 ("discharge of toxic pollutants should be
eliminated as soon as possible"); F. GRAD, supra note 28, § 3.03[4][g], at 3-171 ("As
amended in 1977, the [Act] places considerably greater emphasis on the regulation of
toxic pollutants. . ."). For a discussion of the regulation of toxic pollutants prior to
and after the 1977 amendments, see notes 47-49 and accompanying text supra.
138. See Du Pont, 430 U.S. at 128 (stating that the Administrator can promul-
gate BPT-based effluent limitations as long as he includes some provision for
variance).
139. For a discussion of the regulation of toxic pollutants under the Act, see
notes 47-49 and accompanying text supra.
140. See 33 U.S.C. § 131 l(b)(2)(A) (1982) (imposing obligation to impose BAT-
based effluent limitations on categories and classes of point sources). The evidence
used to obtain an FDF variance may also be inherently biased since it is presented by
the discharger seeking the variance, while an effluent standard set by the EPA is
1983-841
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and nationwide categorical control of toxics, 14 1 categorical shortcomings
must be expected and tolerated. 1
42
IV. CONCLUSION
The drafters of the Clean Water Act realized that cleaning our nation's
waterways would not come without a price. Some industries were expected
to close because of the cost of pollution control. The drafters also realized
that toxic pollution, by definition, seriously endangers living organisms. 143
This commentator asserts that the cost to industry of BAT pollution control
for toxic pollutants is worth the benefits of decreased toxic pollution in our
nation's waterways. The best available technology standard should not be
compromised by statutory or administrative variance procedures in the con-
text of toxic pollutants. 144 In Metal Firmshers, the Third Circuit properly
established the priority of health over administrative ease and industrial ex-
pense.' 45 This priority should be maintained and FDF variances should not
be allowed for toxic pollutant limitations.
William F Ford, Jr.
based on EPA gathered information. See id (BAT-based effluent limitations to be
based on § 304 guidelines promulgated by the Administrator). It is suggested that
there will be less incentive for EPA to conduct in-depth investigations as to the
proper effluent limitation for a particular category of sources if they can merely pro-
mulgate a broad, technically inadequate regulation and wait for the dischargers to
bring the information to them. See id. See also Baum, supra note 56, at 76, 95 (point-
ing out that the EPA's desire to strive for administrative efficiency often overrides
environmental objectives); Cairnes, supra note 4, at 2 (pointing out that even now
"the scientific underpinnings for almost all regulatory objectives are inadequate").
141. See 33 U.S.C. § 1362(13) (1982) (defining "toxic pollutant"). Toxic pollu-
tants do not become less toxic because they are discharged by a source which does not
fit precisely within a specific category. See id
142. See LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 1972, supra note 2, at 128 (recognizing that some
dischargers will be forced to close because of the regulations under the FWPCA).
143. For a discussion of the statutory policy for the regulation of toxic pollu-
tants, see note 28 and accompanying text supra.
144. For a discussion of BAT-based effluent limitations for toxic pollutants, see
note 48 and accompanying text supra.
145. See National Ass'n. of Metal Finishers v. EPA, 719 F.2d 624 (3d Cir. 1983),
certgrantedsub nom. Chemical Mfrs. Ass'n. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.,
104 S. Ct. 2167 (1984).
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